John Simon
A Handbook for Maidens

Joseph W. Bishop, Jr.
Criminals and Victims

THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR®

VOL. 13 NOVEMBER 1980 NO. 11

SPECIAL ISSUE

America on War and Diplomacy

The Current Crisis

A Strategy for the '80s



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EDITED BY R. EMMETT TYRRELL, JR.

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THE CONTINUING CRISIS

• September expired noisily, and as Jimmy's Campaign for National Survival enters its second month, the goody-two-shoes of American politics begins to twitch and to turn to malice. The Sermon on the Mount is set aside as the scamp in the White House grows long in the jowls and begins to scratch and to kick and to hiss.

• Life has been unfair. Throughout the month the Wonderboy was repeatedly being snagged *flagrante delicto* in low deeds: vilifying Ronald Reagan as a racist, making false statements at a press conference, recklessly leaking sensitive national security secrets for political advantage. Then there was that series of scurrilous advertisements in black newspapers, suggesting that Republicans were ardent to unhorse Jimmy because he had placed judicial robes on 37 gentlemen of color. Finally there was that debate that the populist pol sat out—our pundits might have shifted from one buttock to the other, puzzling over its effect on Jimmy's fortunes, but Jimmy understood, and he took action. He auspicated yet another campaign of disparagement. Now a vote for Reagan was not only a vote for racism but also a vote for war. This alarming canard he iterated and reiterated just as Iraq and noble Iran began lobbing artillery shells into each other's oil refineries. Yet the scamp's vilifications and deceits availed him nought. The *Washington Post* whacked him in an astringent editorial felicitously titled "Running Mean," and on September 28 the New York Times/CBS News Poll showed that he had slipped five points behind Reagan.

• As the campaign's fifth week began, it became increasingly apparent that all Jimmy has managed in his administration is to bring dirty-necked, low-down politics to the center of American political life. How do county assessors become county assessors in the cussed, seamy Podunks of backwater America? The 39th President of the United States is instructing the world. Why do such louts not proceed much further beyond Podunk than the United States House of Representatives or a desk in the Veterans Administration? Again the example of the scamp in the White House provides the answers, to wit: They are without principles, they are without vision, they are without competence, and they are without ideas other than the cerebral impulses of a rattlesnake, slithering towards a henhouse, or cornered.

• Early in the month the fabulous Environmental Protection Agency set in motion the processes whereby California will be denied $850 million for, among other conveniences, sewage-treatment plants because of the state's failure to conform with that exalted agency's auto-emissions diktats. The House ethics committee recommended that the Hon. Michael J. Myers, Democrat from Pennsylvania, be expelled from Congress for his bribery conviction in the Abscam scandal, and a second Abscam trial got under way as a federal jury watched an hour-long videotape showing the Hon. John W. Jenrette, Democrat from South Carolina, boodling with an FBI undercover agent and acknowledging that "I've got larceny in my blood." Later Mr. Jenrette's attorney, Kenneth Michael Robinson, explained that actually it was not larceny but alcohol that was in his client's blood. Mr. Robinson protested his client's innocence by claiming that Mr. Jenrette's actions were committed under the influence of strong drink, a plea known as the Sigma Chi theory of criminal behavior.

• In a nuclear power referendum in Maine the antinuclear forces lost another squeaker. This time a mere 59 percent of the voters opted for nuclear power. Senator Mark O. Hatfield, Republican from Oregon, has sent a letter urging his colleagues to attend an "adult education program" at the Institute for Policy Studies, the noted mugwump think tank. There the wide-eyed Senators will be able to drink in the intellectual grappa of such learned mixologists as Gar Alperovitz, Eqbal Ahmad, Ron Dellums, Isabel Letelier, Frank Mankiewicz, Senior Judge David Bazelon, and the stupendous Ivanhoe Donaldson, sage of the local mayor's office. On the other hand, our elected representatives could spend their evenings throwing dirt at each other in Miss LaBelle vonPartridge's dirt therapy sessions held at her Dupont Circle salon. That might improve them too.

• Miss Lillian Carter once again has displayed that extraordinary sense of history that is the hallmark of the Carter family and legend. Spotting an exceptional outdoor privy while lunching in cosmopolitan Ponder, Texas, the dowager of the Carter Era purchased it immediately, noting that it "looks just like the one that Jimmy used to use when he was a boy." Eventually the historic amenity will be shipped to Washington, there to serve as an inspiring centerpiece for the national shrine that doubtless will be raised to commemorate the Carter years. Yet for now it is being brought to Plains for refurbishment and the close scrutiny of Carter scholars. Mr. David Berkowitz, the convicted "Son of Sam" murderer now serving a 315-year sentence in Attica prison, raised somewhat of a row in the literary world when, in the second of a delightful three-part series for the *Buffalo Evening News*, he judged a McGraw-Hill book about him "malicious, disgusting and ridiculous." And one of Attica's former clients, Mr. Robert Giles of Buffalo, has been awarded $52,000 for injuries suffered during his period of residence. While working in the prison's farm Mr. Giles, then serving a one year term for assault, was attacked by a vicious dairy cow and hospitalized for two months.

Jeff MacNelly

• In religious news, army chaplain James R. Johnson was fined $3000 for using sexually explicit language while apprising a female soldier of his sexual fantasies. The decision, the first against an officer during the Army's recent sexual harrassment trials, will be contested by the Rev. Johnson on the grounds of racial prejudice. A Methodist divine, the Rev. Robert Elliott has confected a toney religious ceremony for those couples wishing to embark on divorce, and in Little Rock, Arkansas, "the Sheet People," that pious group that wears only sheets and addresses each other "Brother Christ" and "Sister Christ" depending on gender, is being again harrassed by local authorities owing to their treatment of their children, whom they call "angels." Finally congratulations are in order for Mr. Claude Amos who managed to die of snake bites suffered while worshipping at the Rockhouse Pentecostal Church in Bob Fork, Kentucky.

• A smiling and relaxed Staff Sergeant Charles Johnson was checked into Little Rock Air Force Base Hospital on September 13. Sergeant Johnson is the amazing B-52 crewman who startled fellow crewmembers when he ejected at 29,000 feet and parachuted into a common corn field, because he feared he was alone in the plane. It took the Air Force over twelve hours to reestablish contact with the gregarious airman, an experience that is sure to look bad on his record when the Air Force chooses its next round of astronauts.

• Miss Shirley MacLaine, America's Simone de Beauvoir, issued a bull on September 17, declaring that "Sexuality is the biggest problem today next to inflation." Speaking through her interpreter, Mr. Earl Wilson, the callipygian sage went on to assert: "Do what you want to do and that's it. . . . If Richard Nixon had not been sexually repressed he wouldn't have had to bomb Vietnam or Cambodia." Finally, Mr. Abbie Hoffman turned up in New York as an ecologist, his nose reshaped to look like an eggplant. A stunning use of political symbols, that. —*RET*

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The American Spectator was founded in 1924 by George Nathan and Truman Newberry over a cheap domestic ale in McSorley's Old Ale House. In 1967 the Saturday Evening Club took it over, rechristening it *The Alternative: An American Spectator;* but by November 1977 the word "alternative" had acquired such an esoteric fragrance that in order to discourage unsolicited manuscripts from florists, beauticians, and other creative types the Club reverted to the magazine's original name. *The American Spectator* is now published monthly at 102 West Sixth Street, Bloomington, Indiana. Second class postage paid at Bloomington, Indiana, and additional mailing offices.

A one-year subscription (12 issues) costs $15, outside the United States $17. Foreign air mail rates sent on request. All correspondence (manuscripts, subscriptions, threatening letters, federal grants, etc.) should be sent to *The American Spectator,* P.O. Box 1969, Bloomington, Indiana 47402, (812) 334-2715; New York office, (212) 724-3799. Unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied by self-addressed stamped envelopes. ISSN 0148-8414.

Published remarkably without regard to sex, life-style, race, color, creed, or (most redundantly of all) national origin.

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Volume 13, Number 11, November, 1980.

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EDITORIAL

REAGAN, CARTER, AND CASH

by R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

On September 9, in Chicago—"the city that works," as local boomers still proudly affirm—Ronald Reagan unveiled his economic program, a program for citizens who work or at least who want to work. One must keep in mind that working is not so feasible today as it was in days of yore. Seven and six-tenths percent of the Republic's workers, becalmed in this Age of the Common Carter, cannot get jobs.

Under our President's roof there are counselors who advise that this is to be expected, for the eighties is to be a decade of limits, to which we shall simply have to habituate ourselves. Reagan is out of sympathy with this Malthusian perspective. He calls his program a "strategy for growth." One does not want to make too weighty a point of this disagreement, but Reagan's program does seem to place him more in the tradition of FDR, HST, and JFK than the policy of lowered expectations over which the present administration purrs.

At any rate, one of the reasons that 7.6 percent of our citizens spend their days with idle hands is that the so-called liberals have in their wisdom set up various impediments against economic activity; that is to say, against the creation of jobs. Some of those impediments are government regulations to keep us saintly and healthy and down. Some of those impediments are laws like the minimum wage law that eliminates low-paying jobs—the only jobs some newcomers to the job market are capable of—thus creating unemployment and all the social evils that come with it.

Yet the most onerous impediment against economic activity is taxation. Heavy taxes discourage people from working and creating wealth. They discourage businesses from expanding. They force labor leaders to demand tax-free fringe benefits for their rank and file rather than wage increases.

Even though he came into office roaring that our tax system was "a disgrace to the human race," the tax burden has risen wondrously during the reign of the smartest young man ever to graduate from the Plains, Georgia, high school. So has unemployment. So has inflation. Hockey fans might call this the presidential hat trick. It is an unusual achievement. No other president has accomplished it in this century. Not even Herbert Hoover.



In 1976 the federal tax gouge amounted to 19.5 percent of our gross national product. In 1979 it reached 21 percent, and under present law it is estimated that federal taxes will inhale 24.7 percent of our GNP in fiscal 1985.

To all these robust tax increases Ronald Reagan now proclaims that he would do cruel violence. In his economic program he declares, rather eloquently I would say, that "more than any single thing, high rates of taxation destroy incentive to earn, to save, to invest. They cripple productivity, lead to deficit financing and inflation and create unemployment." His prescription is to cut taxes 10 percent per year for three years, and he wants to reduce business taxes through faster depreciation. After these three years he wants to index taxation so that if the crafty pols on Capitol Hill continue to inflate our economy, they will not be getting away with ever larger hunks of the ever larger paychecks we are forced to earn just to keep up with our past standard of living.

Our President is a very smart fellow—or a quick study, as the cognoscenti of Washington say—and even before Reagan delivered his speech the Wonderboy served up his judgment of the GOP tax-cut plan. Jimmy adjudged it a "very, very serious mistake." Well, when it comes to making mistakes with economic programs, the Wonderboy ought to know. He has, over a period of eight months, fashioned three different programs—all of them attempts to duplicate such New Testament feats as the Miracle of the Loaves and Fishes and the Wedding Feast at Cana, where water was turned into wine. The Wonderboy's last economic program was announced on August 28. He called it an "economic program for the '80s," and a glance at

Adapted from RET's Monday column in the Washington Post.

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its policies suggests that it is not the decade of the eighties but the age group that the Carter administration has in mind. Apparently the administration senses that most of us were octogenarians, all bedridden and senile. Carter will keep us in our beds. His program would turn America into the largest poverty hospital ever heard of. He sees America as one vast geriatric ward.

Placed side by side, the economic programs of Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter reveal antipodal views of mankind. Reagan is the optimist. Carter is the pessimist. Reagan sees us as capable. Carter sees us as inept and wobbling for Skid Row were it not for government's watchful eye. Reagan wants to free us to improve our condition. He believes we can do it, and he is unafraid of the outcome. Carter is not so sure we can do much more than pollute our environment, cheat one another, and line up for welfare. He stands with Kennedy and views the citizens' income as government property to be returned to us only for socially useful purposes.

In sum, Reagan views the American people as a source of energy. He wants to use it. Carter wants to conserve it for pumping rocking chairs on the front porch, for roosting before the boob tube, and for other such dynamic purposes. Lewis Lehrman has described the difference between Reagan's economics and Carter's as the difference between Prometheus and Malthus. Prometheus stole fire from the heavens and championed man against the gods. Malthus scowled, shook his old head, and figured that the human race would run off the edge of the earth instantaneously were it not for crime, disease, war, and vice. He was, naturally enough, opposed to the only one of these pastimes that is any fun. □

CAPITOL IDEAS



EVOLUTION NOW

by Tom Bethell

Governor Reagan, bless his heart, remarked at a press conference recently that he had doubts about the theory of evolution, and supported the idea that creationism should be given separate but equal billing in school biology texts. This was immediately pronounced a gaffe by members of the news media, whose arrogance is exceeded only by their ignorance. As my friend Joe Sobran remarked, one begins to suspect that the news media simply define as a gaffe whatever they do not want discussed. In this instance they see it as their unwritten duty to defend what they perceive as the modern enlightenment against religious assault, much as a good many of the journalists in the 1850s saw it as their duty to defend the church against newfangled science.

Actually, I've been looking for an opportunity to discuss this evolution business for some time now, so I'm grateful to the governor for giving me the necessary news peg. First of all, whether we like it or not, let us at least concede that there has been a certain amount of controversy surrounding the theory of evolution for about 15 years now. (The theory peaked, seeming to have vanquished all rivals, roughly at the time of the Darwin Centennial in 1959, when that poor lost old humanist, Julian Huxley, grandson of Thomas Henry, did his best to declare evolutionism a religion.)

Recent criticism of evolution has come from two very different directions. First of all, there has been a straightforward grassroots assault on materialism, the roughly 150-year-old ideological substratum or bedrock upon which almost all other intellectually certified ideas have since been constructed. Materialism posits a "dead" universe consisting solely of empty space and particles of matter forever seeking greater disorder and randomness (entropy). Roughly speaking, for the 20th-century intellectual the second law of thermodynamics thus replaces the Apostles' Creed. (Whether the second law really is a law in any meaningful and scientific sense of the term may legitimately be doubted. Interestingly enough, the theory of evolution itself contradicts the second law of thermodynamics, as does each and every instance of life.)

In the materialist scheme, mind is regarded either as less easily discerned matter, or a phenomenon somehow explicable in terms of behavior. See Gilbert Ryle's *The Concept of Mind* for a well-known, strenuously promoted but ultimately futile attempt by the modern academy to perform this latter act of reductionism. Mind refused to go away. Thought remained something other than silent speech.

Increasingly militant fundamental-

Tom Bethell is The American Spectator*'s Washington editor and a Washington editor of* Harper's.

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ist religious groups seem to have simply taken it upon themselves to declare materialism bosh; once their position is accepted, the theory of evolution is in an exposed postion, because anyone who is prepared to believe that the universe includes nonmaterial components, invisible to telescopes or microscopes, is by the same token delivered of the necessity of believing in flukey chains of life, chance combinations of molecules, Darwinian reasoning, etc. He can simply believe in a creator, who occasionally intervenes in the material universe, disrupting the uniformity of nature.

Stephen Jay Gould, in one of his essays in *Natural History,* points out that Darwin no doubt lingered for years before coming out with his theory of evolution because he was patiently awaiting (although he might not quite have realized it himself) the full-fledged arrival of the climate of materialism in the Western intellectual air masses. Until it arrived, there was no chance whatever of his theory being accepted. The bishops would easily have swept it aside.

Is materialism now in retreat? One can't help wondering. Stranger things have happened. The resurgence of Islam suggests that something of the sort may be taking place. But the new religious fundamentalism in the United States must be judged only a very distant cloud on the horizon so far as respectable academic opinion is concerned, because it is so lacking in intellectual pretension, and has also, of course, been kept firmly extracurricular and "off-campus."

More interesting, therefore, has been the nervous, ever-so-tentative demurral against Darwinism, raised within the academic compound itself. Oh, it hasn't amounted to much—an article or two in the *American Naturalist,* something recently in the *Journal of Theoretical Biology,* a few articles in the British journal *Philosophy*. (I'm sure Lyn Nofziger, Reagan's press secretary, would be only too happy to provide a fuller bibliography on request.) A few wisps and strands of criticism have appeared in the dense, uniform bamboo thickets of academic rumination that stand forever unread in the university library stacks. But it won't *take* much to undo Darwinism, I should imagine, because it is intellectually so feeble, and indeed precarious.

To digress for a minute, that there has not been more criticism of Darwinism to date tells us how vigilant yet subtle is the censorship imposed by peer review. Authors of academic articles aren't really "censored," of course. They merely want to be published. They therefore tailor their views, if necessary, to avoid displeasing the high and the mighty on the editorial review boards. Precisely because these journals aren't really read by anyone at all, a purely authoritarian system of publication prevails, based on credentials and expertise. "Academic freedom," I guess, is nothing more than a slogan intended to divert attention from such base thoughts. On the other hand, journalism, which for the most part is a "market" system of periodical publication, is prepared to tolerate dissent so long as it enjoys sufficient buyers. The "validity" of that dissent is a secondary issue. Markets, in short, permit the circumvention of experts.

Getting back to Darwin, the main defect of his theory of evolution—by which I mean his theory as to *how* evolution supposedly occurred, namely by natural selection or "the survival of the fittest"—is that it is not a scientific theory at all. Genuinely scientific theories are susceptible of disproof, or falsification. So long as they remain unfalsified they retain their honorific title "scientific." Scientific theories, in short, must dwell permanently in the shadow of defeat. A fact always threatens to come tumbling down on top of the theory, putting it permanently out of business. But Darwin's theory, that the *fittest* animals survive, so leaving more offspring than those that are *less* fit, is not susceptible of disproof in any way. The trouble is that Darwin omitted to provide us with a criterion of fitness that is independent of survival itself. And so his famous theory of natural selection turns out to be a tautology in disguise.

Look at it this way: What conceivable animal could come lumbering over the horizon, so strangely made that it forced the scientists to conclude that Darwin had finally been proved wrong? No one has ever been able to suggest any combination of features that would have this effect. This is because the mere existence of such a creature, however weird it might be, would always be sufficient to validate the lame claim that the fittest had once again survived. By contrast, when one thinks of the theories of Newton, Einstein, Kepler, et al., one can think of numerous outcomes in nature which, if observed, would destroy their theories immediately. Darwinism, however, is *logically* immune from falsification, thus useless.

The function of the theory of natural selection has been to provide evolutionists and scientists generally with an apparent "machinery" of evolution. The great problem that Darwin and other early evolutionists had to explain was: How did life get from primitive blobs in the primeval soup to its present glorious state? Darwin furnished an (illusory) explanation, one that was couched in the language of progress. You had "fitter" models, and they naturally displaced those that were less fit. Unfortunately, no one has yet been able to tell us what is meant, objectively, by the notion of fitness. No independent criterion of fitness has been proposed. (Well, to be honest Stephen Jay Gould did have a shot at solving this problem in another of his *Natural History* articles but he didn't come near to a solution. He argued that an "engineer's criterion of good design" is somehow an independent criterion of fitness; but the Harvard professor seems to have forgotten that engineers' ideas as to what constitutes good design vary according to the function of what is being designed, whereas in evolutionary theory organisms have *no* function beyond leaving offspring.)

You may have noticed that if natural selection is not a scientific hypothesis, nor is creationism. It's useless to pretend otherwise. To say that life on earth conforms to God's plan, or some such thing, cannot possibly be falsified since we don't know what God's plan is. Moreover, no intervention, or disruption of the uniformity of nature has ever been observed. To that extent, then, I must disagree with Governor Reagan. Creationism is not a topic for biology books but rather for theological ones.

The human psyche seems to be constructed in such a way that old ideas are not discarded until new ones are ready to take their place. I personally don't object to the explanatory vacuum that is left when you throw out Darwin's evolutionary mechanism, but I find that most people do. "What do you put in its place?" they ask. "God knows," I tell them. But that doesn't satisfy them.

It seems to me quite possible that evolution in fact took place as a result of mechanisms that have never been elucidated at all. On the other hand, I think it is just as likely that the theory of evolution—the theory that all organisms throughout history (save the first) have had parents—is simply not true. Either way you look at the matter, there is a massive lack of evidence. And with that unaccustomed declaration of open-mindedness, I shall close. To sum up briefly: Reagan, as usual, was close to the mark; and the media, as usual, were wide of it. □

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AMERICA ON WAR AND DIPLOMACY

Introduction by Stephen Rosen

Nations that have suffered military reverses require the same things that defeated soldiers require if they are to recover their self-confidence and spirit. For both, nothing is so demoralizing as incompetent leadership that squanders lives and money with no visible success. Before we can reasonably expect the revival of American morale, the United States must first choose new leaders who are able to make a convincing case that they will not repeat the mistakes of the past. Critics of the present administration should recognize, however, that although a change in leadership is possible and even likely, it is less clear that conservatives and anti-Communist liberals have actually come to terms with the failures of the containment policies of the late 1960s and early 1970s. America's foreign policy was in disarray long before Jimmy Carter became president, and recent efforts to create a policy of neo-containment have avoided explicit discussion of why old containment blew up in our faces under Presidents Johnson and Nixon. To the extent that a search for the roots of our failure in Vietnam would revive the ideological bad blood of that time, it might well be deferred.

But in many cases, the flaws in the old policy of containment stemmed from intellectual inadequacies in the theories of war and diplomacy that we developed in the first flush of our global power. Many of these theories, as they were implemented, revealed characteristic weaknesses.

To begin with, these theories were remarkably apolitical. Strategic nuclear policy was shaped in large part by scientists who believed that technology had created the nuclear problem and that appropriate technology would permit the solution of the problem. Certain technologies made for arms races and "instability" while others were more benign. To the extent that nuclear weapons policy was not made by scientists, it was made by economists who looked at the problems of nuclear war and peace as if they could be solved by determining the cheapest way to deliver a given amount of equivalent megatonnage on target. Systems analysis played an analogous and equally pernicious role in shaping our conventional war capabilities by reducing battle requirements to issues of administration and resource allocation. Third World policy was understood as a matter of diverting the attention of Third World leaders away from "wasteful" military spending and foreign policy adventures toward international trade and economic growth. Once Third World leaders overcame their vainglorious political objectives, the economic attractiveness of the USA would give us unrivalled influence in Asia and Africa. In all of these areas the primary military and political questions—who would win wars and who would rule—were almost completely ignored by American analysts who, at bottom, wanted to create a world in which force was not a tool of state policy and in which economics would replace politics.

Beyond being apolitical, these theories were remarkably abstract. That is to say that they had a cheerful disregard for prudence and the intractability of reality. This abstraction was related to, but separate from, the apolitical nature of American policies: We were not indifferent to politics when we asked the American Army to fight in Vietnam; we were hopelessly indifferent to the actual capabilities of our military. Similarly, we were not only inattentive to Soviet foreign policy objectives when we created our nuclear weapons policies, but were also blind to the fact that the Soviets thought about war in ways completely different from our own.



We were indifferent to politics and reality not because we were more stupid than most countries, but because the immense power of the United States in the period during which these theories were developed allowed the new American foreign policy elites to indulge their domestic ambitions and international pipe dreams. To a surprising extent, the attention of men like McNamara was fixed on seizing power within the American government, on reducing the influence of the traditional military elites. The new theories were levers with which to pry out the men who insisted that war was still the most important element of international politics.

If it is possible to isolate the errors of the first generation of liberal foreign policy analysis, that does not mean that we can find ready answers among the conservative political thinkers in the United States. Conservative foreign policy, as near as can be seen, rests on the development of American military power and on uncompromising hostility towards Communism. In its own way, it is just as unrealistic and apolitical as the liberal approach that it opposes. The logic of conservative foreign policy is to get ready for the big war with the Soviet Union, win it, and then come home. It does not really reconcile its legitimate hostility to the internal policies of the Soviet Union with the need to avoid the kind of major war that would be necessary to put an end to that regime.

The second generation of American foreign policy analysis would accept the

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ideological basis of the conservatives, but would moderate it by acknowledging that our foreign policy should not focus primarily on fighting and winning World War III and that for the forseeable future the Soviet Union is going to remain a powerful and hostile force in the world. Our actions should be guided by older conservative axioms. Abroad, as at home, there are no permanent remedies for the pains of our political condition; we can, at best, hope to ameliorate those conditions. The unintended consequences of foreign policy, as of domestic policy, are likely to be as or even more important than the desired ones. The limitations on political action, in short, mean that prudence is the most necessary quality in a statesman, something both left- and right-wing Americans have forgotten in their efforts to solve the problems of world politics by ending world politics.

The limits to American power and the permanence of international conflict were considerations very much in the mind of Henry Kissinger as he began his attempt to reconstruct American foreign policy in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Astute as his policies were, he seemed to have forgotten that traumatized nations need something beyond competence if they are to recover. They need an explanation of why it is reasonable for them to send their men out to die. Kissinger dealt with the collapse of the American will to fight by isolating, as far as it was possible, the conduct of American foreign policy from the public and by relying on diplomacy. If the people were not willing to fight, he would not ask them to. Secret, shuttle diplomacy did not require popular or congressional support when the going was good. When diplomacy failed, however, and American foreign policy required the expenditure of lives and money as in Angola in 1975, the weaknesses of Kissinger's style of cabinet diplomacy were revealed. Some efforts to establish a policy of neo-containment seem to call for containment without the ideology of the Cold War. These calls and Kissinger's strategy have both failed to understand what Senator Moynihan has long pointed out: Men will not vote to go out and get themselves killed unless they have a vivid idea of what the fight is about.

The articles in this issue suggest ways in which competence can be restored to the conduct of American foreign policy, but it is the revival of the anti-Communist ideology that will provide the rock on which our morale and future efforts can be based. This ideology will face many problems, not the least of which will be that anti-Communism and support for liberal regimes abroad do not always seem to be synonymous. This gap created severe problems at home in the 1960s. The saving grace of the bad times in which we live is that the necessity for collaboration with less than perfect governments is now more visible because the Soviet Union is stronger. Nor will an anti-Communist ideology necessarily prevent the American people from deciding that the safety of the West and the safety of America are two different things. Neither competence nor ideology can take the place of a sense of national honor. This can only be created by genuine leadership, by men who ask whether after two hundred years of republican government and two world wars, ours will be the generation that turns its back on civilization. —*sr*

Stephen Rosen

HIDING FROM THE NUCLEAR AGE

In American strategic thought, MAD policies of convenience are a bad substitute for serious defense planning.

For the last 15 years American thinking about nuclear war has been dominated by an idea that by now seems as natural as it is simple. War will be deterred by the existence of a stable nuclear balance. But what if deterrence fails? The strategic theories of the 1960s were suitable for the 1960s, and the emphasis on deterrence was proper when the chance of war was small. But an examination of the development of American strategic thought reveals that an emphasis on what ought to be done if nuclear war did break out was often thought necessary. Since World War II, the major groups involved in American strategic planning, the scientists, the military, and, later, the civilian strategic analysts, have traditionally displayed a striking sobriety when real danger was in the air. With the United States today no longer in a dominant strategic position, it is necessary to restore realism to American strategic planning.

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At the outset of the Cold War, the American scientific community would have preferred that problems caused by the emergence of nuclear weapons be resolved through international agreements regulating the use of atomic power. Yet when efforts towards this end quickly proved impractical, the scientists did *not* immediately turn to assured destruction, the doctrine with which they would later become closely associated. This is surprising. Military theorists such as Bernard Brodie had already articulated the essential elements of assured destruction and the doctrine is one with obvious allure to the scientific mind.

The idea of a mutual hostage relation among nuclear powers is simple and logical, far more so than the messy, inelegant theories that had emerged from conventional military operations. Unlike the unpredictability of conventional wars, assured destruction promised a simple war. Assuming that the enemy had also adopted assured destruction, war would be based on attacks against undefended civilian targets and would involve no clash of opposing armed forces. Cities would simply stand still while attempts were made to destroy them. In addition, because of their familiarity with missile and aircraft engineering and with the physical effects of nuclear explosions, assured destruction would give the scientists a distinct advantage over the generals in any political struggle for influence in the area of strategic policy. Assured destruction thus meant that military competence would become, all at once, superfluous.

In the area of international politics, assured destruction offered the scientists the realization of their dream of world peace through world harmony. It seemed

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to eliminate the need for arms races, for once both nuclear powers obtained enough second-strike weapons, they would stop producing additional weapons. At the same time, a fear of mutual annihilation would create a common interest between the United States and Soviet Union. By forcing the two superpowers to overcome their differences, assured destruction thus contained strong incentives for the creation of a peaceful world order.

For all these reasons, it might be expected that the scientific community would have embraced assured destruction with open arms. Instead, for the 12 years beginning with 1948, the scientists advocated a policy diametrically opposed to assured destruction—they called for the adoption of defensive systems, whose chief purpose would be to minimize the destruction that a nuclear war would cause the United States.

In 1952, the dean of American nuclear scientists, J. Robert Oppenheimer, and many of his collegues participated in a conference called the Lincoln Summer Study. The conference discussed the state of American air defenses and concluded that the American nuclear force structure had become grossly distorted by its emphasis on offensive strategy. After speaking with some of the participants, Stewart Alsop reported that "the experts believe" that the Soviet offensive forces were becoming increasingly more dangerous, and that the remedy lay in "very early warning devices, ground-to-air guided missiles," and an emergency engineering project that would construct these defenses at a cost of up to "$25 billion in a two-to-three year period." The defensive orientation of the scientific community was underlined further during the Atomic Energy Commission's 1954 investigation of Oppenheimer. Suspicious of Oppenheimer for a variety of reasons, the investigators also wanted to know if Oppenheimer had "espoused what might be described as a Maginot line type of defense?" In response to this hostile question, a flock of professors from Harvard, MIT, Cal Tech, and Columbia testified in Oppenheimer's behalf that his call for greater defensive measures was perfectly sensible. Isadore Rabi of Columbia, who later went on to edit the anti-militarist *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* summed up the position of his colleagues:

> . . . I think Dr. Oppenheimer and I agreed. It is threefold. One, we think that to protect the lives of Americans is worth anybody's while. Two, that one is in a stronger position in a war if one is fighting from a protected citadel, rather than just being open. . . . Thirdly, and it is more political, that the existence of such a defense would make us less liable to intimidation and blackmail.

Today, conservative critics of the assured destruction doctrine argue that the doctrine may fail if the Soviet Union decides not to leave itself open to attack as we do, and concentrates rather on winning the military contest. Rabi was making a similar point 25 years ago when he testified that the threat to retaliate

> is a psychological weapon, a deterrent. But the other fellow may not be the same as you, and you have to have some kind of defense before he does you irreparable damage, and, furthermore, your plans may not go as you expect. They may miscarry. Unless you have a defense, you are not getting another chance.

These and similar statements by other scientists testifying before the Agency are remarkable primarily because they came in many cases from men who by 1967 would be opposing an anti-ballistic missile defense of the United States. This shift in attitude is explained in part by the scientists' eventual disillusionment with their earlier experiences. The Air Force interpreted their advocacy of strategic defense as an attack on the Strategic Air Command, and so responded with its own criticisms of the scientists' "Maginot Line" mentality. More important, by the late sixties the scientists were arguing that technological progress had rendered unfeasible their earlier vision of the United States as an impenetrable, protected citadel.

To be sure, technology had changed, but not necessarily to the point where defense was no longer worth pursuing. Although ICBMs were far more difficult to defend against than bombers, the radar, missiles, and computers used in defense systems had also improved dramatically. As imperfect as our actual anti-bomber and proposed anti-missile defenses might have been, both would have reduced the extent to which the United States would have been open to blackmail and intimidation, as Rabi pointed out.

Unfortunately, what had changed most during these intervening years was just this perception of the probability of blackmail and intimidation. So long as the Korean War, the Soviet-American dispute over Germany, and the memories of Stalin's diplomacy contributed to the feeling that a direct Soviet-American conflict was possible, the scientists regarded strategic defenses as attractive. But as the danger of war began to recede, the scientists became preoccupied with the disadvantages of strategic defenses. On the practical side, they stressed costs; we would be forever having to improve and increase these strategic defenses in response to the Soviet Union's continual development of its offensive forces. On the psychological level the scientists feared that because strategic defenses made war seem less apocalyptic, statesmen would be more willing to risk war. Moreover, the scientists feared that strategic defenses would be destabilizing, encouraging the enemy to attack before the strategic defenses were implemented. The scientists, then, advocated strategic defenses in the early 1950s when the danger of war was great and opposed them in the late 1960s when the danger of war was small. Why?

An explanation for this puzzling intellectual shift suggests itself. The presence of danger concentrates the mind. Its absence removes the immediate need to make realistic plans for survival, leaving one free to pursue those objectives that had been set aside when tensions were at their peak.* By the time of the post-Khrushchev thaw, the scientific community was fully

*In a similar fashion, the strong advocate of arms control, Paul Warnke, defended the anti-Chinese anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system in 1967 when the Peking government seemed to be in the hands of hostile fanatics and the danger of war, however slight, seemed real. He, too, used the argument that an ABM would reduce our vulnerability to nuclear attack and intimidation, and he, too, washed his hands of the whole idea once relations with Peking improved and the danger of war receded.

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content to pursue its natural preferences by openly advocating assured destruction.

For its part, the military community responded to the birth of the nuclear age by demobilizing. In 1946 and 1947 the Air Force possessed perhaps two dozen Nagasaki-type atomic bombs, but these were kept unassembled in stockpiles. It would have required a 24-man crew two days to assemble one bomb, but there were no such crews available after the men of the Manhattan Project had dispersed. Thus, the Air Force's military strategy remained essentially unchanged from World War II. To counter any Soviet advance into West Europe, the Air Force would attempt to destroy Soviet war production, particularly its oil-refining capacity. This would eventually weaken the Red Army, but it would be defeated only by allied armies fighting it on the ground. This doctrine was not illogical given the weaknesses of our atomic forces and the history of the war against Hitler. The equivalent of at least 500 Nagasaki bombs had been dropped on Germany, most of them in the last 12 months of the war, and still the Wehrmacht had fought to the end. The U.S. Air Force had 29 atomic bombs to drop on a country 30 times as large as Germany. It was an air-power doctrine with strictly military objectives, although it was recognized that the destruction of Soviet oil refineries would inevitably be accompanied by the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians.

There was, however, an obvious discrepancy between the plans of the Air Force and the political need of the United States to protect West Europe without turning the entire continent into a battlefield. By 1948 the Berlin crisis forced the military to rethink the problem of safeguarding Germany without destroying it. The hour found its man in Curtis LeMay, who advocated the expansion of the American nuclear arsenal for the purpose of "nation killing." We would conduct a campaign lasting about one month to destroy the 70 largest urban-industrial centers in the Soviet Union, which would, by itself, end the war. This was not a doctrine of deterrence, but of military victory. Nonetheless, its bloodthirstiness set off a ferocious debate within the armed services. Rear Admiral Daniel Gallery denounced the strategy as clearly unacceptable: "For a civilized society like the United States, the broad purpose of a war cannot simply be the destruction and annihilation of the enemy." The strategy of annihilation "is a strategy of desperation and weakness. I believe we should abandon the idea of destroying enemy cities one after the other until he gives up and find some better way of gaining our objective."

This argument was in some measure the reaction of an Admiral to a war without a Navy. But it was also the reaction of a soldier to a strategy designed to kill as many enemy non-combatants as possible. Moreover, Gallery's conclusions were supported by an inter-service committee chaired by an Air Force General, Hubert Harmon. This committee unanimously agreed that, as long as our conventional defenses remained weak, it would be necessary to plan for an attack on Soviet cities, but that such attacks would disgust the world, and would become terribly dangerous once the Soviet Union had the means to retaliate.

Contributing to the fierceness of this debate was the simple fact that there were not enough nuclear weapons to go around. Not until 1951 were there as many as 400 atomic bombs in the U.S. arsenal, which was still inadequate for use against both military and urban targets. The age of nuclear plenty that quickly followed silenced but did not resolve the debate over what kind of targets to attack. Although money has continued to be available for routine development and modernization, which has allowed the services to acquire more and more warheads, in the absence of a well-defined doctrine, this has been an incremental process without a clear logic. As a result, the military has never formulated a clear rationale to help justify the acquisition of weapons powerful and accurate enough to attack the primary military targets inside the Soviet Union, the Soviet ICBM silos. Instead, the armed forces have until comparatively recently acquiesced in the doctrine of assured destruction.

This acquiescence is explained largely by the difficulty the military has had in coming to terms with its mission in a nuclear age. From its viewpoint, additional money for strategic forces has always meant less money for aircraft carriers, tanks, and manned aircraft. Soldiers, sailors, and pilots are more likely to be motivated by the prospect of combat than by the idea of cruising in a hidden submarine or sitting in a missile silo command post. The military thus has been content with a strategy that limits its strategic nuclear obligations, but which releases monies for conventional wars against Soviet soldiers. In addition, the American military has never taken to defensive strategies. If the alternative to assured destruction is a strategy of shelters, urban evacuation, and ballistic missile defenses, all designed to minimize American civilian casualties, then the military prefers to retain an offensive posture.



The early 1960s was a period of crisis, and, as in previous crises, the heightened tension that marked the first Kennedy years resulted in realistic strategic thinking. The question raised by Kennedy during the Berlin crisis of 1961 was the same as the question raised by the scientists during the crises of the 1950s. How can we protect the American people? Once again, it seemed necessary to think about what would happen if deterrence failed and war ensued. When Kennedy, in July 1961, called for a rapid expansion of the American civil defense program, he was advocating the only means available for increasing the safety of Americans. Given the relatively small size of the Soviet nuclear strike force, this shelter program would have been extremely useful. As more and more American missiles became operational, we obtained a nuclear superiority that made it possible to consider a strategy of striking at Soviet missile installations, instead of Soviet cities, and so reduce the number of casualties on both sides. This was in fact the policy set forth by McNamara in his speech at Ann Arbor, Michigan, in 1962. But having begun, like

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the scientists, by calling for programs that would reduce civilian suffering, the Kennedy administration quickly backed away and adopted the principles of assured destruction. After the Cuban missile crisis, the beginnings of detente together with the growing superiority of America's nuclear arsenal made war seem quite distant.

For his part, McNamara, while dedicated to the security of the nation, was also determined to establish strict and rational civilian control over the American military. Not surprisingly, this desire for rational controls found its strategy in assured destruction, which under McNamara reached fruition and has continued to dominate our strategic policies to the present time.

Students of bureaucratic politics have long noted that it is easiest to bend an organization to one's will if it is possible to set out clear criteria by which the performance of the organization can be measured. It is difficult to apply such criteria to a peacetime army, since the only real criterion of military success is victory on the battlefield. Assured destruction, however, offered an opportunity to lay down straightforward measures of success in a nuclear war. If we could "deliver" payloads of a few thousand tons to a finite list of fixed Soviet locations under a certain set of conditions, we could rest easy. No more money would need be spent on these weapons, no matter what the generals said. With this doctrine, strategic success became almost as simple to define as success in delivering milk, and civilian control, in this area at least, was enormously facilitated. It is not surprising that McNamara quickly dropped the idea of "counter-force" targeting against Soviet strategic forces. An enemy could hide, move, defend, or increase his military assets, and we would have to increase our forces to deal with these problems. Nuclear war would then become as complicated as conventional war. Thus, the criteria of being able to destroy one-third of the Soviet population and two-thirds of its industry were sufficient for McNamara to justify a 10 percent cut in the Navy Polaris fleet, and to halt Minuteman deployment at 1000.

The problem today, unfortunately, is that our present strategy was made in happier circumstances than we now enjoy and lacks that fixed concern with national survival which now is more important. During the 1960s, strategic analysts busied themselves inventing scenarios for the initiation of nuclear war. The most plausible ones assumed the outbreak of an anti-Soviet rebellion in East Germany, followed by a West German invasion of East Germany, American intervention, and general war. This ignored the fact that there had already been massive riots in East Germany in 1953 during which we had done what might have been predicted—exactly nothing. Now, it is easy to imagine a Soviet-American war for control of the Persian Gulf. We cannot permit Soviet control of this part of the world. The Soviets may well believe that we have neither the strength nor the resolve to resist them. Yet, if they do march into Iran, and we do respond, what will happen if we do unexpectedly well, and the Soviet Union is faced with a massive military defeat right on its own border? What will happen if we do so poorly that we must contemplate the destruction of our expeditionary force? Either side may decide that the threat to use—or actual use of— nuclear weapons is preferable to the alternative.

In view of this new danger we must consider, as others have done during earlier crises, how best to protect ourselves. To do this, we will have to overcome our fear of "instability," an idea that for the last 15 years has paralyzed any movement toward strategic defenses. We have convinced ourselves that the USSR-U.S. relation is "stable" if we are able to kill each other's civilians, but that war will result if we try to reduce the amount of damage civilians would have to endure in a war. As we begin defensive programs, the Soviet Union, it is supposed, will perceive a threat to its ability to strike at American civilians and missiles, and thus will decide to go to war to prevent any further erosion of its position.

Only someone who has immersed himself in the arcana of strategic theory to the exclusion of everything else could begin to believe this. It is implausible that the Soviet Union would start a nuclear war that would cause the deaths of millions of Soviet citizens only because we had begun serious planning for the evacuation of our cities—planning which could save the lives of tens of millions of Americans. The Soviet Union itself has already completed extensive plans to evacuate its cities in a crisis. At no time did we feel in the least bit compelled to start a war before these plans were completed. In a crisis, the evacuation of American cities would certainly prompt the evacuation of Soviet cities, if this had not already occurred, but not a strike that would leave the Soviet Union in ruins.

As its long history suggests, civil defense has never been provocative. American civil defense efforts during the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Chinese civil defense effort in the wake of the 1969 border clashes with the Soviet Union, and the sharp increase in the Soviet civil defense program in the early 1970s induced no threats or attacks. Yet these programs, in theory, were "destabilizing." Nuclear war, however, even if one is superior and protected, is a frightening prospect, and it is not likely to be touched off by anything short of impending military or political catastrophe.

To a surprising degree, there is agreement, shared by the liberal employees of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the conservative analysts of the Committee on the Present Danger, that civil defense programs based on urban evacuation can be very effective in saving civilian lives. ACDA has estimated that 10 to 15 percent of the Soviet population would be killed by an American attack if the Soviet cities had been evacuated. T.K. Jones of the Committee on the Present Danger has estimated a death rate of about 5 percent. Given the uncertainties associated with such estimates, it would be foolish to take a dogmatic position in defense of either figure. The difference between 5 and 15 percent dead is quite large; in the case of the Soviet Union, it is the difference between 13 and 40 million dead. Although both figures represent catastrophic damage, they are closer to the fatalities suffered by the Soviet Union in World War II than they are to the total destruction of



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civilization that we usually believe will result from a nuclear war.

The other major method by which American lives might be protected is through the use of ballistic missile defenses (BMD) to shoot down enemy warheads. Proposals to do this have created an enormous amount of controversy, largely on two grounds. First, the familiar complaint that BMD would be destabilizing and would make war more likely; second, that it could be easily overwhelmed by the attacker. Here, again, we find that there is historical evidence that suggests that the importance of "stability" has been exaggerated. Both the United States and the Soviet Union began work on operational anti-missile defenses in the 1960s. This caused neither war nor an increase in tensions, though, of course, Soviet construction did create pressure in Congress for a matching American system. Even if greatly more effective than its predecessor, BMD in the 1980s will not provoke war any more than anti-missile defenses did in the 1960s. No BMD system under consideration will be accurate enough to prevent extraordinary destruction in the event of nuclear war—although BMD could help to preserve our national existence. Again, the idea that a government would go to war just because its enemy had begun work on its defenses is completely fanciful. A government so ready to risk destruction would have gone to war long ago.

We should not find it alarming that governments *are* likely to begin work on their defenses when they see their enemy doing so. If we can protect our population as well as or perhaps better than the enemy, why should we be unhappy that we can kill "only" five instead of fifty million Soviet citizens? Our thinking on this subject has been so twisted by the ideas of "stability" and assured destruction that it has become necessary to remind ourselves of the obvious: We have absolutely no interest, as such, in killing Russian civilians. Simple morality as well as reasons of state demand that we try to minimize the number of civilian casualties in any war we fight. As our ability to defend ourselves increases, our need to hold innocent Russians hostage decreases. Soviet BMD systems are no threat to us as long as we can protect ourselves at least as well. If both sides deploy defenses, there is likely to be a competition between the two, but it will be a contest to see who can save the most lives on its own side. On the surface, at least, this seems to be a competition a good deal more benign than the present competition in destructive power.

It is by no means clear, however, whether we can do anything to protect ourselves with missile defenses. If the Soviet Union can simply add more offensive warheads more cheaply than we can shoot them down, the defense will be playing a losing game. This is a complex technical question, but some figures are suggestive. In 1969, the largest Soviet missile, the SS-9, cost around $30 million, according to the congressional testimony of American Defense Department experts. The latest Soviet heavy missile, the SS-18, is far more sophisticated than the SS-9. Assume it also costs $30 million. If each SS-18 carries ten warheads, one additional warhead will cost an average of $4 million. In 1969, the American anti-missile interceptors cost approximately half that amount. These interceptors, however, needed radars and computers to guide them. The radars alone cost over $100 million each, and were relatively vulnerable to enemy attack. Had *we* started building extra radars to make sure enough would stay in operation, it would have run into billions of extra dollars. If the need for radars and computers could be removed, however, the cost of the defense would drop radically. For the last ten years, the Army has been working on just this problem, and with some success. By utilizing interceptors that use methods and hardware analagous to those now used in conventional "smart" weapons, the need for ground-based radars and computers is greatly reduced, if not eliminated. No revolutionary technology is involved, only sensors and miniature computers derived from those used in existing air-to-air missiles costing $100,000. The methods that make it possible to shoot down a multi-million dollar aircraft with a missile costing thousands of dollars are also applicable to anti-ballistic missile defense.

It will, of course, be possible for the attacker to fool, blind, or destroy some of these new homing interceptors. The battle between offense and defense will become a complicated military problem, instead of remaining a simple problem of delivery. Yet the possibility of substantially reducing American civilian casualties, in conjuction with civil defense, does exist. A doctrine designed to reduce the number of American dead would deal with the existing danger of a war caused by miscalculation, and would reduce the extent to which the United States would be sensitive to Soviet nuclear diplomacy. This doctrine would emphasize defenses because it would recognize that an American offensive build-up that would enable us to strike at Soviet missile silos would inevitably be countered by the development of Soviet mobile missiles. Unconcerned with the need to make their mobile missiles compatible with an arms-control agreement, the Soviet Union could rapidly and relatively cheaply deploy missiles that we could not find and so could not destroy. A doctrine of damage limitation would evaluate the success of strategic programs by counting the number of American lives saved, rather than of Soviets killed. It would acknowledge that strikes at enemy civilian targets are, as Admiral Gallery noted long ago, a desperate measure, and the need to carry out these strikes should be minimized.

It is a curious fact that our fundamental military doctrine for the last 15 years has rested on the threat to commit suicide. Sober reflection reveals that such a doctrine was irresponsible, unnecessary, but convenient. We have escaped the consequences of our irresponsibility, first, because we were strong and the world was peaceful, but also, because we were lucky and the Soviet Union cautious. It would be an error of the highest order for us to allow the foreign policy and even the existence of the United States to continue to depend on the caution of the Soviet Union. We live in bad times, and our doctrine must come to terms with them. ⊓

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Stephen Sestanovich

RENEWING A BEAUTIFUL RELATIONSHIP

Our allies in NATO are different now.

It is now widely if not well understood that America's alliances are a problem. The point has of late been so tirelessly expounded that those with a little historical perspective have had to explain that something called "disarray" is the usual condition of the Western bloc. And yet these corrective views have failed to overcome the impression that the difficulties the alliance now faces are in many ways quite new—so new that we may not be ready for them.

The most important change defining the present debate about the alliance is the growth of Soviet power, but important as this is, it only begins to describe the problem. In one respect after another, the patterns of past crises and disagreements are being reversed. Past alliance crises were activated, curiously enough, by the prospect of Soviet-American relaxation; this one is created instead by Soviet-American tension and fears of war. Where once the Europeans feared that the United States would let them down, now the United States angrily detects appeasement in them. If once the United States declined to negotiate with the Soviet Union so as to protect European morale, now European morale seems to leave no choice but to accept Soviet negotiating offers. Above all, earlier conflicts within the alliance over extra-European issues did not impair unity against the Soviets. By contrast, events elsewhere in the world could now break down the fundamental alliance structure of East-West politics.

Little remains, in short, of the time when the most terrifying prospect the alliance had to face was that someday the antagonism between the Soviet Union and the United States might disappear. Past analyses of the politics of the alliance often asked, in one way or another, whether it could survive if this happened. The anxiety was sharp even when hypothetical, for its premise seemed undeniable: The direct physical security of the United States did not require defense of the perimeter that it had marked out against Soviet expansionism. Its commitment to that defense seemed instead to depend on how broadly the United States defined its interests. And as a result the fear arose that in a pinch the United States would treat its allies as a nuisance, a source of risk without compensating benefit. Although Europeans wondered how the United States would behave in wartime, their fear was equally political: What would the United States do if it found that the allies' political goals could be pursued only at the expense of its own?

That the United States might be dissuaded from the very large commitments it had assumed was not lost on the Soviet Union, which sought room for maneuver in the uncertainties of American allies. Playing on German fears, for example, Khrushchev's February 1961 letter to Adenauer warned him explicitly that the United States and Soviet Union were nations with global interests, to which the concerns of smaller powers would sometimes have to be subordinated. Better then to be cooperative. The tenor of Khrushchev's approaches to American leaders was similar. Didn't they see that issues like Berlin should not be allowed to obstruct the search for better relations? Hence his taunt to Kennedy: Having defeated Germany in the war, was the United States now unable to control it?

Certainly U.S. allies could be made out to be a burden. In Berlin, Germany asked the United States to forgo détente with the Soviet Union; at Suez, Britain and France asked that we pass up openings among non-aligned states; as Soviet power grew everywhere, the allies asked for always more risky commitments. In every case, the active and nagging question was, would we let them down? Between this past pattern and the present, the symbolic bridge was West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel's telling remark to Henry Kissinger in 1969: His country, he said, no longer feared Soviet-American condominium. Quite the contrary, the allies were eager to make the most of détente.

The end of a crisis, it seemed: Détente resolved the anxiety that had been part of alliance politics since its inception. But it only seemed to raise more acutely the question, what would become of NATO itself? Like other organizations that had outlived their original purpose, the alliance was to be recast. And so on its twentieth birthday, with the pace of East-West détente accelerating, NATO's leaders pledged that the Atlantic partnership would take up the common concerns of modern industrial societies—environmental pollution, alienated youth, and so forth. Similarly, when Henry Kissinger reported to Congress on the state of détente in 1974, his observations on American alliances implicitly assumed that their main problem was obsolescence. "The experience of the past year," he insisted, "has demonstrated that there is no contradiction between vigorous, organic alliances and a more positive relationship with adversaries; indeed they are mutually reinforcing." Even critiques of American alliance policy, like the Democrats' of 1976, treated the problem as how to maintain solidarity

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against the background of Soviet-American rapprochement.

This too was a kind of crisis—"identity crisis" was the popular term—but it was made more bearable by events. The burden of proof was on those who in the fatter years of détente saw immediate danger in the atrophy of the alliance.

Today's alliance crisis is, by contrast, sharpened and made more dangerous by events, since it revolves around the question of what role other countries are to take in growing Soviet-American hostility. The fears of the earlier period, to overstate only a little, were about the terms on which peace would break out; today's, about whether the peace can any longer be kept.

This, then, is a crisis created by bad times rather than good. Parts have accordingly been reversed: Now it is the United States that fears its allies will let down. And naturally Soviet opportunities have been transformed. If Soviet leaders once told worried Americans that too great a loyalty to their allies would suck them into trouble, our concerned allies now hear from Moscow of the dangerous consequences of excessive attachment to us. To paraphrase Khrushchev, minor powers have their parochial concerns, to which the global interests of the superpowers will sometimes have to be subordinated.

Not so many years ago, of course, the United States and its allies had no trouble fending off, sometimes with little explanation, Soviet negotiating probes. The seriousness of Soviet negotiating offers could not be known with certainty, but it was usually a decisive argument against them that they might limit the West's freedom of action, and unravel its new political unity. The Germans, it was said, would be distressed.

Today the United States feels unable to protect an emergent Western consensus with straightforward rebuffs. (Above all, the Germans would not understand!) Still more striking is the lack of confidence with which the United States approaches the question. In the fifties, although American leaders doubted the firmness of German public opinion, they had boundless confidence in German leaders. In the late sixties, now doubting German leaders, the United States relied in part on public opinion as a restraint. Taking advantage of its role in the Berlin negotiations, and of the German public's commitment to a Berlin settlement before further progress in détente, the United States was able to set the pace of Soviet-German rapprochement. In the eighties, mistrustful of both German leadership and opinion, the United States will feel it lacks any instruments of alliance unity.

As always in the past, disagreement between the United States and its allies is sharpest on extra-European issues. But if the disagreement is not new, its significance is. Past discord on such issues rarely undermined the ability of either the United States or its allies to conduct a coherent policy toward the Soviet Union. Suez and Vietnam were major crises for each side, but the divisions they engendered did not decisively affect East-West relations. In this sense, East-West conflict was once truly divisible.

No longer, and this change is perhaps more important than any other. The stakes of extra-European conflict are now just as important (one could argue they are more so) for the future of the alliance as specifically European issues. A major defeat *outside* Europe could now split the alliance apart *within* Europe. And still the allies seem tempted by the notion of "divisibility."

When Europeans explain this idea, they often get their true policy strangely backwards. While boasting of strong resistance to Soviet expansionism elsewhere, they voice hope that Europe can remain a haven of détente. In fact, our allies are in some ways more helpful on NATO affairs, where, after all, only incremental change is at stake, than in extra-European affairs, where an honest break with their isolation is required.

The Administration's fixation on the Persian Gulf at the expense of the American role in Europe has, of course, helped to strengthen this divisibility in the minds of many Europeans. All the same, responsible or not, the United States may not react comprehendingly to the European view. For it still considers—however exaggeratedly—that in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere in the world, it is defending others even more than itself. When they show little comprehension of this, or of the part they must play, the worst American responses—and perhaps a final alliance crisis—are invited.

II

How will the United States respond to its alliance problems? The tone of most alliance writing on the subject is a danger sign: Our commentators commonly express exasperation, anger, even contempt for our allies. And American policy has begun to show some of the same marks—displeasure bordering on punitiveness, disgust bordering on disengagement. A very small straw in the wind was Senator Bayh's recent proposal to empower the President to impose tariff penalties on all goods from countries not fully supporting American policy toward Iran and Afghanistan; our allies were singled out as a target.

Cooler heads have so far prevailed against what may have been mere election-year heat. Yet there are obstacles within our own policies to a revival of the alliance. In America both the Left and the Right, though they view the problem very differently, have no special liking for allies and, not knowing how to treat them, tend to treat them badly. Analyzing this, DeGaulle complained that the United States "brings to great affairs elementary feelings and a complicated policy."

It is not mere absentmindedness, innocence, or malice that governs here, but conservative and liberal thinking about world politics. The temptation to treat our allies badly goes beyond confusion about who our friends are. True, both left and right have strong loyalties for those whom they see as their counterparts in other countries, but these ideological affinities and antipathies are least in evidence in dealing with our closest allies. Instead, the

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motives on both left and right that produce conflict with our allies spring from their view of America's proper role in the world.

The uneasiness of the Left with alliances is clearly the more straightforward. Alliances imply that the great problem of world politics is still security, and that it is eased by choosing up sides. Worse, our allies are the world's insecure; they want something from us and want us to use our power to get it for them. Only an America with an extended role in the world and ready to deploy its power can do so. Alliances stand between the Left and the achievement of a more isolationist, or at least less assertive, America.

The Left knows that its dislike of a large American role in the world opens it to the charge of neglecting our friends. And it has developed ways of ducking it. Hence, for example, the Left's enthusiasm to prune the list of our friends, on grounds that they are unworthy. (This works: The unattractiveness of the Park regime in South Korea broadened the acceptance of an otherwise absurd proposal for American withdrawal.) When a friend's needs cannot be challenged, nor its worthiness impugned, the Left may profess strong support, while ignoring the connection between American power and the ability to meet our alliance commitments. Israel is the most conspicuous case of an American ally many of whose eager defenders otherwise oppose a large American international role.

When all else fails, alliance commitments can be regretfully shrugged off as simply too difficult to meet. A recent article in *Foreign Policy* magazine made this point about the U.S. stake in Western Europe:

> . . . because the cases America cares about most are also most demanding and possibly terminal, they are the ones the United States would in fact—*and should in principle*—shrink from defending.

However extreme this view, it unashamedly (and by appealing to principle!) states the Left's dislike of allies: They ask too much. And the more likely it seems that the United States may actually have to defend Western Europe, the more we will hear this argument. There are, in fact, already the seeds of such resignation in the Administration's inclination to build our capabilities in the Persian Gulf at the expense of forces elsewhere: carriers from the Mediterranean and Pacific, plans for wartime redeployment of forces. Unfortunately, our commitments cannot be met on the cheap in the future, for during an acute crisis in the Persian Gulf the vulnerability of our European allies to Soviet intimidation would also increase sharply. As a result, the cost of defending our allies may be much higher than even the world-weary Left has charged. If East-West conflicts are now less divisible, they will also be more expensive to deter or (if it comes to that) to win.

The Right must point this out, but it must also inquire into its own blindnesses. For conservatives have a matching hostility to allies that needs to be recognized, and it too may worsen matters. Indeed it may be more important now to understand the temptations of the Right, for it has already acquired a kind of intellectual ascendancy, and soon perhaps an institutional one, in the rethinking of our foreign policy. But unlike the errors of the Left, those of the Right are too little noted. If anything, conservatives generally pride themselves on keeping our commitments (*solemn* commitments, one says). That the United States defends allies is treated as a measure of American greatness. Alliances involve both an exercise of power and a test of honor: Both of these gratify the Right. The absolutism of Jesse Helms in defense of Taiwan typifies the Right's attachment to allies. The more heroic, the better.

Senator Helms notwithstanding, the Right's record is as problematic as the Left's. If the Left dislikes alliances because they require power, the Right will, ironically, as often find that they *inhibit* the exercise of our power. Unlike the Left, the Right sees the unavoidable tasks before us in the world, but is for this very reason impatient with allies who seem to deflect American policy from them.

The cooperation of allies and others is often needed to achieve American purposes, but if they resist our wishes, the Right is likely to feel that the reason is an inadequate respect for American power, or perhaps simply inadequate power. Thus, John Connally's proposals on the Middle East took for granted that Israel could be made to yield its resistance to a Palestinian state by the increase of American strength in the region. This, even though that strength (in the shape of a new fleet, or of B-52s in the Sinai) bore no discernible relation to the difficulties that a Palestinian state would create for Israel. Possessing great power, one can forget what others' insecurity is all about.

Connally has made a career of cracking allies' heads, but this impulse is no exception on the Right. In milder form it appeared even in Walter Laquer's recent article, "Euroneutralism," which expressed indignation with *Ostpolitik*. After all, he wrote, "Germany needs the U.S. much more than the U.S. needs Germany." Where the Left prefers that allies not call on us because we *don't* have the power, the Right recommends that they be cooperative because we *do*. This is what conservatives mean when they joke about reintroducing the Mansfield Amendment. It is ironic (and a little pathetic) that what was once the expression of American policy in retreat is now treated as the symbol of American assertiveness, a way to restore alliance discipline.

This outlook was much in evidence last year during the ratification debate on SALT II. Having argued for several years that the treaty would make restoration of a military balance in Central Europe more costly and difficult, the treaty's opponents somewhat sheepishly discovered that the Adminstration had mustered the unanimous support of NATO for ratification. It was unfair to take the Europeans' endorsement at face value, as did the Administration and liberal supporters of SALT II, yet rather than urge that their view could be changed under American leadership, most opponents of the treaty simply refused to believe that the allies were telling the truth. And although conservatives were

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able to trace—correctly—the trends in world politics that had produced the allies' view, their approach to changing it seemed to forget these trends. It was too common to hear the view that the allies could be brought around by—again!—a few threats to withdraw American troops.

In short, although the Right may value alliances as an expression of power, it is uncomfortable with them when they are an obstacle to American power or freedom of action. They require an acceptance of the lowest common denominators that often govern coalitions, and this has had its costs. In the campaign to recast our foreign policy, our allies have unquestionably slowed us. They block our shortcuts to clarity and action. Because alliances are hard to manage at a time when conservatives want to make a clean break with past policies, the ascendancy of the Right may not be able to head off a deeper alliance crisis.

III

Bad instincts about allies do not doom American alliance policy to failure. They do mean that simple compromise between the outlooks of left and right is not adequate; a new policy must reject key features of each. While overcoming the Left's unhappiness with power, it cannot rely too much on the Right's overconfidence in it, on the thought that "in the end" (after all, an ominous phrase) our allies will have to be with us. They may well be, but now is a peculiarly inappropriate moment to invoke "the end" as a basis for alliance unity. As conservatives have led in pointing out, the West's military position is precarious, and the Europeans understandably fear policies that may bring an ultimate test closer.

Against the background of such anxieties, the United States will—in a sense, for the first time—have to practice serious coalition management. The task will not be easy, for too many of our allies have become habituated to paralysis. Accordingly, the next administration has to demonstrate to its allies that, imbalances notwithstanding, they retain, and must exploit, real freedom of action.

The European members of NATO seem to doubt this, as though détente had increased only *their* stake in good East-West relations, without any reciprocity. Yet plainly their flexibility is high, if only because Soviet-American tension increases the value in Soviet eyes of ties with the Europeans. Far from requiring greater European caution, the American lead in confronting the Soviets opens up maneuvering room for our allies if they will but use it.

This point ought at last to be sinking in. The French neutron bomb test, revealed last June, in particular taught a salutary lesson. Soviet silence on it showed reluctance to take on the Europeans, and implied that the earlier campaign against an American neutron bomb was just so much talk, whose target was alliance unity. Similarly, last December's NATO decision on medium-range missiles has shown that, even in the face of Soviet propaganda barrages, Western unilateralism can bring results: in this case, the first hint of Soviet interest in serious negotiations.

These events may slowly restore confidence among our allies, but U.S. policy need not wait on events. In addressing the issues on the alliance agenda, a new administration should in every case seek out the path that increases our allies' sense of their own freedom of action. Often, left and right may have embarked on different paths.

Spending is just one example. Both left and right charge that our allies do not bear a fair share of the common defense. Charts illustrating the gap in per capita military expenditures have by now become quite familiar, and generally accompany a demand that the Europeans (and the lowest spenders of all, the Japanese) increase their budgets. For the Left, of course, such increases would substitute for American power; for the Right, they would demonstrate it.

Comparisons between U.S. and allied outlays seem to speak for themselves: American spending per capita is approximately 25 percent higher than West German, and the rest of NATO is still further back. In the past decade, although Europe's stake in events beyond its own boundaries has grown, neither its own power nor its support of American power has expanded in like measure. As U.S. military spending climbs, the rich economies of our allies will seem an ever more inviting source of funds for a broad alliance effort.

While urging a greater effort, however, the United States should not make a fetish of its allies' military spending as such, and Congress should be kept from forcing the question on its own. For the spending issue is much more complicated than the charts suggest. Even the figures are in doubt: Because U.S. manpower costs are those of a volunteer army, our military budget overstates our military effort. If one measures just investment of operational costs, the difference between U.S. and German spending narrows. And if one calculates NATO budgets using American manpower costs, the spending gap between the United States and its allies disappears altogether. After a decade in which Germany's real military outlays increased 30 percent while ours dropped, spending hardly entitles us to blame the Europeans for lack of political will.

More important, the United States should not propose increases that appear merely to shift the bills to our allies. Measures now before the Congress would require increased European support to maintain American forces in Europe and to construct Indian Ocean bases. The House Appropriations Committee, for example, recently recommended that "several projects in Europe be funded by host nations as a cost offset program for our expenditures in the Middle East." The proponents of these schemes commonly insist that they have no *thought* of using European contributions to cut overall American efforts. But even if this were not in doubt (and let us be honest: it is), American policy must aim at more than an increase of allied aggregate resources. For it is not irrelevant who within the alliance acquires

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the real military capabilities and who acts as the bankroller or subcontractor.

A plan that provides for more European spending on support-style costs may free American resources to build up military strength where needed, but if it reduces European resources for the same purpose it will defeat a larger aim. Its politico-psychological effect will be to preserve a limited European sense of freedom of action, based on shrunken capabilities and parochial vision. Lack of confidence that they can have an impact outside Europe assures our allies' impotence in practice; feeling impotent, they will also feel that their interests diverge from ours. Since an enlarged definition of national interests is unlikely to emerge without enlarged capabilities, the United States should foster a debate within allied countries about military projects that matter.

If spending is linked to the scale and shape of a nation's interests, it is also inseparable from its strategy. The United States spends more than its allies in part because it aims at a different capability. Some of the margin between American and alliance spending is made up by strategic nuclear forces and by a worldwide navy. These forces confer a special status and independence. Is the United States to propose that its allies spend at a comparable level, without acquiring either its status or its independence?

It may seem obvious that the European states cannot be fully independent, period. Yet this issue is never far from the surface of NATO politics. Michel Jobert, Henry Kissinger's antagonist as French Foreign Minister, recently asked whether the United States is ready to encourage its allies to develop the same independent military establishment that France has created. Since it obviously refers to Germany, the question is startling when posed by France. But since the French will in fact oppose such independence, what the question really shows is how the Europeans will argue against higher spending. (There is a curious alignment here: Americans who resist higher spending say our allies don't help enough; like-minded Europeans say *all* we want is help.)

Naturally the United States should resist this ploy. It cannot be permanently bashful about seeking higher German military spending just because the *Bundeswehr* has no nuclear arms; the moment does not allow such delicacy. Yet it is also foolish to pretend that it is easy to call for higher German spending to support existing defense strategy. The direction of a war effort, after all, would be largely out of German hands, and even its *success* would destroy a great deal of Germany. This prospect can only worsen our conscience (making us ready to let them off the hook) and heighten German resentment (leading them to resist our wishes).

Nothing short of a new strategy may fully resolve some of the tensions of the spending issue. NATO will have to give consideration to a new posture based on taking the military counteroffensive in response to an attack from the East. With freedom to fight the war out on others' soil, with more confidence that they could deny any conceivable Soviet objectives, NATO governments would be less likely to fold under political pressure and war threats. The larger point is this: Some kinds of spending (more than the levels) increase freedom of action; other don't.

A new strategy may, admittedly, be even more contentious than spending alone. Especially in the aftermath of Gdańsk, a counteroffensive capability will suggest thoughts of intervention, and this will inflame opposition in the alliance. But the Polish summer has also been a reminder that such events can spill into a broader European chaos, in which Soviet restraint may ultimately break down. As these dangers become palpable—and they are likely to become steadily more so in this decade—there will be more agreement that the alliance needs to acquire this freedom of action.

IV

More than ever before, American alliances in the decade ahead will be neither what the Left nor what the Right would desire them to be. They will be neither a simple substitute for, nor a simple tool of, American power. The international balance of power will hardly permit the former; the domestic and regional considerations that guide our allies' course are too diverse to permit the latter.

American policy will have to adjust to both of these realities. For the first time it must earn its allies every day. Even so simple a policy as that described here—using increased military capabilities to increase freedom of action—will prove full of problems. And since disenchantment with allies is likely to be the rule on both left and right, it will be a major task merely to keep these difficulties in perspective.

It will be said, first, that this policy ignores the uneasy relations our allies often have with one another. They do fear one another, and arms will increase their fears (of one another and us). Here the United States will repeatedly have to consider a break with one of the most ambitious and distinctive aspects of the alliance policy pursued since 1945. It was one of the most certain marks of American strength (as well as of self-confidence and, sometimes, of naiveté) that alliances could be sought on both sides of some of the world's great hostilities. Even the rearmament of Germany could have been much more explosive than it was, and more destructive of Western unity, had not the United States been so much more powerful than the other members of the alliance and so deeply engaged in European affairs.

Will our policy have to become more modest, more exclusive? The United States, feeling relatively weaker, will sometimes see an urgent advantage in choosing one side or the other. Israel *or* Saudi Arabia, India *or* Pakistan, Greece *or* Turkey. And in Central Europe the endless dithering of the small states on the big issues may push the United States toward an ever more direct bilateral tie with Germany. If others squeal about German power, many Americans will say, so much the worse for them. ➟

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A new exclusivity will appear to free an alliance policy that is otherwise paralyzed by the competing claims of America's friends. And it may prove particularly attractive to those most eager to unshackle American power, whatever must be sacrificed in relationships with other countires. Yet we should not make these sacrifices in advance, nor underestimate what the careful use of American power can achieve. This power, if we do not ignore the possibility, can moderate the hostility of allies. More direct and even apparently exclusive ties with one state can enhance ties with others. Only, perhaps, when American support for Pakistan is beyond doubt will India take seriously the importance of good relations with the United States. By the same token, journalists and government officials of the small European states will say privately that a stronger Germany actually *increases* their stake in NATO, and their incentives to keep pace. Britain and France will feel this pressure still more. A stronger Germany may be the best lure, in fact, for revived French participation in NATO—particularly for the Four Power Directorate already said to be functioning informally.

Competition among U.S. allies, in other words, need not stymie a policy designed to strengthen them. Still less should the United States be daunted by the thought that in enhancing their power the United States will also enhance their independence. Freedom of action, to be sure, is also freedom to oppose us. Yet to preoccupy ourselves with this problem, however much the behavior of our allies may urge it on us, is to miss the real problem we confront. Americans of both left and right will be uncomfortable, and more, with the independence of strong allies, but the independence of weak allies will be something else again. The United States will be able to earn the confidence of its allies only by increasing their confidence in themselves. □

Steven R. David

WIELDING ALIGNMENTS

Adjusting to the reality of the Third World.

The coming decade is virtually certain to bring increased American-Soviet competition for influence in the Third World. The demand for scarce resources, the growth of Soviet military capabilities, and instability in the Third World itself will all contribute to greater superpower confrontations and threats to American interests. How well the United States does in this struggle will depend greatly on its success in convincing Third World regimes to adopt a pro-Western or—at the very least—a non-aligned posture.

This process seems in one respect to be very complex. Issues of ideology, trade, aid, and image can all affect the choices Third World countries make. Essentially, however, the problem is a good deal simpler. If the United States can demonstrate an ability and willingness to protect the leadership of those regimes it hopes to attract, it will enhance its influence in the Third World. And this will be possible only if the United States can convince these select individuals that political alignment with the West is in their best *personal* interest.

The need to provide for survival follows from the nature of the Third World, where nearly all countries are run by dictatorial regimes in which the significant foreign policy questions are decided by a single individual or at most by a small group. When one speaks of a Third World state aligned with a superpower, one is really referring to the chosen orientation of a certain individual or group of individuals. Therefore, to secure a pro-American alignment it is reasonable that the United States meet the needs of this narrow but critical elite.

For these elites no need is greater or more pressing than the need to stay in power. This is not because Third World leaders are any more ambitious or megalomaniac than their Western counterparts, but because the threats they face carry much graver consequences. Confronted with a situation in which conflict or the threat of conflict is endemic, where institutional means of succession are often lacking, and where loss of power can mean loss of life (as the recent fate of Liberia's chief of state so gruesomely reminded us), it is not surprising that Third World leaders are intensely concerned with defending their position. In a sense, then, the success of the United States in the Third World will depend on how well we can manipulate and satisfy two of the most basic human desires—the drive for power and the fear of death.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the United States promoted long-term political and economic development that would lead to the establishment of liberal democracies as the best way to insure the survival of pro-Western regimes. This remains a noble idea. Given the fact that it took the West several centuries to develop such governments, we have no reason to abandon our hopes for the Third World—in the long run. With the United States and our allies so increasingly dependent on raw materials such as oil, however, we can no longer afford to wait for the Saudi Arabias of the world to transform themselves into functioning democracies.

This does not mean that the United States should simply back any anti-Soviet or pro-Western leadership, without first considering the character of the regime, its importance to American interests, and the type of support demanded. Moreover, in most cases, it would be unrealistic to expect American support to require direct U.S. intervention whenever a regime faced trouble. The United States must, however, demonstrate that it will act effectively within the limits of its commitment to make certain that the leadership it chooses to support remains in power. Admittedly this appears to be a short-term solution, but it must be remembered that such "short-term leaders" as President Sadat of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan are still with us. In most cases, at any rate, the long-term alternative of a stable, liberal government simply does not exist.

Of all the causes for the fall of Third

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World leaders, revolution has been by far the most studied. Yet as important as it may seem (the examples of China in 1949 or Iran in 1978 come to mind), revolution is a rare phenomenon, and one that we do not really understand and can rarely influence.

A more frequent and manageable threat to Third World rulers is caused by conflict directed against a regime. A foreign power might invade a state with the express purpose of removing the regime in that state (as Tanzania did with Idi Amin) or an outside power's successful attack might create conditions favorable for a coup (as when Nasser seized power from King Farouk following Egypt's disastrous campaign against Israel). Major conflict can also originate within the state itself. Haile Selassie's inability to contain the Eritrean rebellion was one of the reasons for his downfall; meanwhile, King Hassan's problems with the Polisario could yet result in the Moroccan leader's fall from power. Thus if the United States is to attract pro-Western leaders, it must convince them that the United States will provide the assistance necessary to defend their borders. If it is felt, however, that the Soviet Union is in a better position than the United States to protect friendly regimes, the ability of the United States to promote and maintain pro-American alignments will be undermined.

Unfortunately, as the world's leading producer of conventional arms, the Soviets are already the preferred patron in situations requiring security assistance. In a given year the Russians produce approximately six times as many tanks, three times as many armored personnel carriers, eight times the artillery pieces, and twice the combat aircraft as does the United States. This huge pool of weapons is enhanced by the Soviet proclivity (duplicated in their nuclear weapons programs) to stockpile older weapons regardless of age. This enables the Russians to transfer massive amounts of arms without drawing on stocks used by Soviet forces. By contrast, American military personnel are still complaining about the need to strip combat forces in Europe to resupply Israel in 1973. For a less vital country this would be unthinkable.

On the basis of U.S. government statistics, it has been asserted that despite the Soviet advantage in stocks of arms, the United States is by far the largest seller of arms to the Third World (comprising about half of worldwide sales compared to less than one-third for the Soviet Union). Candidate Jimmy Carter used these statistics to proclaim that the United States cannot be the world's leading supplier of arms and the world's leading supporter of peace. Putting aside for a moment the possibility that supplying arms and promoting peace may be mutually compatible, it is useful to realize that the Soviet Union leads the United States in actual transfers of weapons. The explanation for these seemingly contradictory assertions lies in the sales figures, which include support and service costs that often have only an indirect link with the arms themselves (and make up a far greater proportion of American transactions than they do with the Soviets.) Thus when the United States builds a school in Saudi Arabia for military officers, the cost of that school and the roads leading to it are all counted as an arms sale.

Even though the Soviets have in recent years widened their lead in arms transfers to the Third World, it has been suggested that the higher quality of American arms still leaves the United States as the preferred security patron. Indeed, when one examines the upper reaches of technology, U.S. weapons with their sophisticated electronics and computers generally out-perform their Soviet counterparts. Unfortunately, since most Third World conflicts are fought with older, "obsolescent" equipment, this American advantage often proves illusory. This is all the more true since most Third World forces lack the requisite training and expertise to operate sophisticated weaponry (particularly aircraft). As regards the levels of weaponry most commonly used in Third World conflicts—the assault rifles, artillery, armored personnel carriers, antitank arms, and even tanks—it is the Soviets who often possess the qualitative edge. For the armed forces of the Third World what is critical is not whether the American F-15 jet and XM-1 tank are superior to the Soviet MiG 25 and T-80, but whether reliable, usable weapons exist in the field and which side has more of them.

The Soviet capability and willingness to transfer large amounts of appropriate arms to the Third World become even more attractive when one considers price. Generally, Soviet weapons cost much less than their Western equivalents. For example, on the average a regime can purchase five MiG 21s for the price of a single F-5 (variation in models and equipment can move the ratio up or down). What's more, the Russians have demonstrated a greater willingness to discount prices for political purposes. Our frequent demands for payments in hard currency have left some regimes (e.g. Ethiopia) without arms and alienated others (e.g. Sudan and North Yemen) by forcing them to turn to an uncooperative Saudi Arabia for financing.

While the Soviet advantages in arms production, quality, and price are certainly attractive to regimes considering a pro-Soviet alignment (and chilling to those that are not), it is the *speed* with which the Soviet Union can respond to immediate crises faced by Third World leaders that ultimately makes it such an attractive patron. Together with their skilled use of proxies, this has given the Soviets a crisis intervention capability that, in the eyes of most Third World leaders, is unmatched by the United States.

On the average the Russians deliver their arms in one-half the time of the United States, according to an unclassified CIA report. Their huge stockpiles enable them to draw from existing stocks, while the United States must frequently delay arms shipments (as we did with an Ethiopian request for Phantoms) until the requested arms can be manufactured. Furthermore, the Russians enjoy a relatively unfettered political process of arms transfer, which allows them to implement decisions rapidly and massively. The United States, on the other hand, must normally confront a bewildering array of executive and congressional committees before an arms deal can be completed. By the time a favorable decision is reached (if



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indeed it ever is), it is very often too late.

The Russians also maintain a significant edge over the United States thanks to their greater skill in using proxies. Because political and other factors have precluded direct Western and Soviet interventions in most Third World conflicts, the capacity to project force into Third World conflicts through well-trained and disciplined proxy troops has become highly significant. This becomes particularly clear when one bears in mind that most Third World forces are often ill-prepared to fight a major engagement with modern weapons.

The Soviet use of Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia amply demonstrated the power of competent proxies to decide the outcome of a conflict. One does not have to view the Cubans as Soviet puppets to realize that the coincidence of Cuban and Russian interests, whether forced or not, is rapidly producing a situation whereby Soviet support is perceived as being tantamount to victory. Small wonder, then, that a high-ranking African official recently remarked that no leadership in Africa is now prepared openly to defy the Russians.

Aside from the overall benefits proxies can provide for a threatened regime, they have proved absolutely essential for any leadership seeking to change military suppliers in the midst of a conflict. It takes approximately nine months for trained Third World pilots to adapt to new aircraft and about six months to retrain tank crews. Maintenance personnel for new equipment take even longer to train. These lead times make it impossible for a leadership to turn to a new supplier when war is imminent or underway unless the new patron can provide the manpower to operate the new arms. An examination of the recent Ethiopian and Yemeni conflicts—both of which began when one side was in the process of changing arms suppliers—illustrates the importance of proxies and the Soviet superiority in this area.

Since 1953, Ethiopia's military had depended on the United States as its main source of weapons. This relationship ended abruptly in 1974 when the Emperor Haile Selassie was deposed in a military coup. The new Ethiopian leaders resented the United States for having allowed their archenemy Somalia to achieve with Soviet help what they regarded as military superiority. Consequently, they turned to the Russians for aid in coping with Somalia as well as with other threats. In the summer of 1977, the Somalis, realizing that the Ethiopians were now caught between suppliers, and fearing for their own long-term security in the wake of the new Russian preference for Ethiopia, seized the opportunity to strike at the Ethiopians to settle their long-standing irredentist claims. The invasion proved to be a stunning success as the Somalis by September nearly captured the ancient Ethiopian provincial capital of Harrar. If Harrar had fallen the Ethiopian leadership—and the Soviet position in Ethiopia—would have collapsed.

The Russians reacted with a massive shipment of arms to Ethiopia (amounting to approximately $1 billion or three times what the Ethiopians received from the United States in 25 years) which, although impressive, was virtually useless to the American-trained Ethiopian forces. With a Somali victory imminent, it was clear that weaponry alone would not be enough. It was in this context that the Cuban intervention proved decisive. Transported directly to the battle front by the Soviets (who also served as commanders), the Cuban troops (who eventually numbered 17,000) stemmed the Somali advance and, in time, along with the newly trained Ethiopian forces, rolled the Somalis back, ending the threat to the Ethiopian regime. One wonders what the U.S. reaction would have been if a Soviet-trained Ethiopian army had turned to the United States for assistance in the middle of a conflict. Would we have sent arms quickly enough? Would they have made a difference?



These questions were possibly answered two years later when an American attempt to prop up a friendly regime in North Yemen proved ineffective. Although its armed forces had been Soviet-trained since 1962, North Yemen had shown signs of seeking closer relations with the West, beginning with its rapprochement with Saudi Arabia in 1972 and continuing because of Soviet support for South Yemen. With Saudi backing, North Yemen concluded two arms deals with the United States in 1976 and 1978. Normally, delivery of these arms would have required several years, but in February 1979 North Yemen was invaded from the South. When Soviet advisors in the North refused to help, the North Yemenis appealed to the United States for assistance.

In response, President Carter declared his first arms transfer emergency. His argument for suspending normal procedures was the immediate North Yemeni need to stave off the South Yemeni assault, thereby preserving the wavering pro-Western regime of North Yemen and quieting Saudi fears. The arms did arrive promptly in March, but the North Yemenis did not have the faintest idea how to use them and American efforts to persuade the Saudis to serve as proxies proved fruitless. Fortunately, this almost comic episode did not end tragically, since Arab mediators in the meantime had succeeded in resolving the conflict. The details of the confrontation aside, however, Third World regimes could not escape the conclusion that had the conflict continued, it would have confirmed the impotence of American assistance. Perhaps this consideration contributed to North Yemen's subsequent appeal for renewed ties with the Soviets.

As depressing as the military assistance picture might seem for the United States, it is not entirely bleak. The United States is generally considered to be superior to the Soviet Union in its training programs, supply of spare parts, and maintenance of arms after delivery. In addition, U.S. advisors (despite the "ugly American" reputation) are usually much better received than their Russian counterparts. For all their importance, however, these long-term American advantages are of little consolation to a regime that is in immediate need of military assistance. The Soviet knowledge of its edge in this critical area guarantees that many regimes will be facing just this need.

Unfortunately, we are no better at

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protecting leaders against coups. It is, of course, difficult to devise strategies for the protection of friendly regimes against people in their own midst. Military bases in the country, foreign aid, or influence with key groups do not ensure the safety of any government, as the United States learned in Libya and Ethiopia (and the Soviets in Somalia and Egypt). True, the United States has not been totally inept in protecting regimes from internal challenges. As is now well known, the United States helped to restore the Shah to his throne in Iran in 1953, and in 1960 rapid American action succeeded in preserving Haile Selassie's position in Ethiopia in the face of an attempted coup. This type of action, however, has been rare, and, with American intelligence under ever increasing constraints, it is likely to become even more infrequent. What's more, the United States lacks a strong capability to influence the elite politics in which most coups originate. In this area, as with military assistance, it is the Soviets who are developing the more effective policies.

In reaction to recent setbacks in the Third World, Soviet policies today are designed not merely to protect a Third World leader, but rather to prevent him from straying from a pro-Soviet path. Again, skilled use of proxies is crucial to this process. By utilizing Cuban and East German security personnel, this "cocoon"-like strategy ensures effectiveness and loyalty to Soviet goals without incurring the political costs direct Soviet involvement would bring. For the most part the Cubans have been subordinate to the East Germans in this area, with most of their activities restricted to providing bodyguards for individual leaders (such as Mengistu in Ethiopia and the late Neto in Angola).

It is the East German domination of internal security in Third World countries, however, that is giving the Soviets unprecedented control over Third World leaders. Much more active than their Western counterparts, the East Germans have taken the lead in penetrating and controlling the upper echelons of several Third World governments. Presently, the East German State Security Service (SSD) has advisors in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Yemen, and probably Libya. The East Germans have been particularly useful in training bodyguards, advising both military and civilian intelligence agencies, and in establishing secret police networks. While the East Germans are consequently in an ideal position to prevent coups, their activities have not all been defensive. In countries where the leadership is suspected of anti-Soviet feelings and no pro-Moscow "progressive" party exists, the East Germans have been busy behind the scenes urging the creation of such a party or making contacts with opposition groups that might provide more "correct" leadership in the future. By protecting and threatening a leader at the same time, the East Germans have made it clear that the survival of the regime is in their hands, giving them enormous power over that regime's decisions.

To see how the Soviets have increased their control over Third World leaders, one need only look at the Soviet use of East Germans and Cubans in Ethiopia, whose leader, Mengistu, now finds himself $2 billion in debt to the Russians and saddled with an increasingly unpopular presence of some 15,000 Cuban troops as well as several thousand Soviet and East German advisors. Now that the most dangerous external threats to his survival have been overcome, Mengistu must be under considerable pressure to emulate Anwar Sadat and expel the Soviets and their allies, repudiate his debt, and perhaps even turn to the West for assistance. Unfortunately, surrounded by Cuban bodyguards and with both his regular and secret police forces under East German control, Mengistu is unlikely ever to risk this course of action.

Nor is Mengistu unique in his fear of the Soviets. Across the Red Sea from Ethiopia, in South Yemen (also called the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) the Soviets have clearly demonstrated the will and capability to use threats in molding regimes to their liking. The Russians began their campaign by signing a ten-year military agreement with South Yemeni President Salim Ali Rubay in 1972. When Rubay showed signs of becoming too close to pro-American Saudi Arabia, the Soviets, according to many observers, along with the East Germans and Cubans, assisted in 1979 in his overthrow and execution, replacing him with a dedicated Marxist, Abdul Fattah Ismail. When Ismail, however, proved uncooperative in the Russian attempt to develop closer ties with North Yemen (in the wake of the ineffective American effort to provide security assistance), the Soviets apparently helped to depose him. Understandably, the latest South Yemeni leader, Nasser Muhammad, has gone out of his way to demonstrate loyalty to the Russians.

The Soviet actions in South Yemen, bolstered by its behavior in Afghanistan (where the Soviets set a new standard by personally executing a Third World leader and his family), have sent chilling sensations through the bones of Third World leaders. The fact that the Russians have succeeded in being invited into any country at all is a reflection of the desperation many of these leaders must feel. In these conditions, the United States must demonstrate to these leaders that they can now rid themselves of Soviet involvement without suffering the fate of their predecessors.

Even if it is accepted that the Soviets have several advantages when it comes to protecting friendly Third World regimes, many would ask whether this is truly a matter for concern. After all, for the countries that matter most (such as Saudi Arabia) the United States will surely overcome any institutional or ethical constraints to insure the survival of pro-American regimes. If the Soviets wish to extend their influence to the rest of the world, why not let them, especially since experience has demonstrated that any such gains might very well be short-lived.

In response, a few brief points: First, though not vital to the United States many Third World countries (such as Zaire) contain needed raw materials. If they fell under hostile control, Western economic and national security interests would suffer even if, in the long run, alternative sources of supplies could be developed. Second,

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countries which in themselves are not important to the United States may border on countries which are. No one has suggested that the United States has vital interests in North Yemen, but its defection to the Soviets could have a profound impact on Saudi Arabia. What's more, if the Soviets can maintain influence in enough countries they will be able to control regional security to the point where anti-Soviet governments and realignments towards the West will become a thing of the past. Nor can the United States evade its obligations by hoping the Soviets will eventually be forced out of the countries in which they have become involved. The Soviet Union was eventually expelled from Egypt, but only after a period of 20 years, during which time their influence caused us numerous headaches. How complacent would we be about a twenty-year Russian presence in Saudi Arabia? Moreover, as suggested above, the Soviets have begun to learn from their mistakes. Getting them and their German henchmen out of Third World countries will be increasingly difficult in the future. Finally, there is the moral factor. Since we exist in a bipolar world (in terms of military power), for the United States simply to concede most of the world to Soviet domination because of a lack of direct interest would be a cowardly and, in the end, a disastrous policy.

How then can the United States better protect the leadership of Third World countries? In the area of military assistance several policies would be welcome. The process of arms transfer must be streamlined to eliminate many of the time-consuming and irrelevant checks. To enable Third World nationals to use these arms, the United States should develop expanded and more rapid training programs, especially in those relatively simple weapons that often decide Third World conflicts. For countries previously in the Soviet sphere of influence that turn to the West in the midst of a conflict, the United States must have proxies available, such as Pakistanis, South Koreans, or Egyptians, to provide for immediate defense. In addition, the United States should develop a capability to produce and stockpile spare parts for Soviet weaponry to enable a state that is in the process of switching sides to continue to use Russian arms. Weapons produced solely for export should be encouraged (if we are going to transfer arms to the Third World they should fit existing defense needs too). Furthermore, the United States under certain conditions might want to consider direct action against the proxies themselves, such as a blockade of Cuba. Finally, the United States must make it clear to the Soviets that massive interventions in regional conflicts will cost them in other areas of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

In order to provide leaders with greater protection against coups, the United States must first enhance its foreign and covert intelligence capabilities. Greater cooperation with allied intelligence agencies, especially in keeping track of opposition groups, should be encouraged (the Israeli intelligence establishment was much better informed than the United States about the coming Iranian revolution). For vital countries such as Saudi Arabia the United States must maintain the ability to project American troops quickly into the capital to foil any coup attempt. In these situations speed is most critical, not numbers or armor. As a high intelligence official recently remarked, it is better to move a battalion of U.S. troops in a matter of hours than to transport an armored division in a matter of weeks. For less-than-vital countries the United States should have prearranged plans with allies or pro-Western regimes in the area for rapid transport of loyalist or proxy troops to defend pro-American regimes (Libya and Egypt demonstrated the value of cooperative efforts when they jointly reversed a Communist-inspired coup against President Numeiry of Sudan in 1971). In addition, the United States should establish links with lower-ranking officers (most coups begin with or are supported by the military) to avoid the "leapfrogging" of junior personnel to power over the heads of their pro-American superiors (as in Libya and Ethiopia). Finally, we must make it clear to leaders that if deposed, despite our efforts, they can be assured of securing asylum in the United States.

For these suggestions to have any impact, basic changes must first occur in the attitudes of many U.S. government officials. These attitudes have been that the Third World is essentially a peaceful place with sovereign governments willing and able to deal with any problems that might arise, that conflicts are strictly regional affairs to be settled without U.S. involvement whether or not the Soviets and their allies are present, and above all, that arms transfers and other forms of security assistance are a basically dirty business to be avoided whenever possible (a view reflected in President Carter's ill-fated and short-lived arms transfer policy). In effect, then, the preferred policy has been to rely on American economic strength in the belief that, in the long term, once the shooting has ended, countries will turn to the United States for developmental assistance.

Sadly, these views correspond little with reality. The Third World is not peaceful, outside forces are and will continue to be critical in determining regional disputes, and as important as economic developmental needs are for Third World leaders, they are clearly secondary to their concerns for political and physical survival. This is not to suggest that the recommendations put forth above are a substitute for effective long-term policies. Even if the United States succeeds in preserving the tenure of friendly leaders, it must still grapple with fundamental problems such as determining which regimes are worthy of its support, the amount and type of assistance to be provided, and the manner in which these regimes respond and adapt to change in the Third World. These considerations cannot, however, exist in isolation from what is happening now and what is needed now. If the United States fails to provide for the short-term survival of our friends in the Third World, all the long-term planning and good intentions won't be doing them—or us—any good. □



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Eliot Cohen

SYSTEMS PARALYSIS

Social scientists make bad generals.

Robert McNamara once confessed that he considered the introduction of systems analysis to the Department of Defense to be his greatest legacy to American military policy. The Office of Systems Analysis—now the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation—is no longer as powerful as it once was, but many defense experts, consciously or not, use the systems analysis approach when they discuss military problems as diverse as the acquisition of a new strategic bomber and the future of the tank in land warfare. The purpose of this article is to define systems analysis, examine its logic, and describe the political and military consequences of its acceptance by the American defense community.

After World War II three types of strategic thought developed in this country. The first, naturally enough, was the theory of strategic war, whose argot (hard-target kill capabilities, time-urgent countermilitary potential, etc.) was vaguely known to the public if not thoroughly understood by it. The second was the theoretical treatment of problems of limited war, which began in the 1950s as an offshoot of the larger strategic discussion, but took on a life of its own thereafter. During the early 1960s sociologists, political scientists, and stray economists took limited war in a new direction, and elaborated theories of counterinsurgency for use in Southeast Asia. After the Vietnam fiasco discussion of limited war ended, but it seems likely to return as defense planners and strategists attempt to cope with the Persian Gulf problem. Both strategic-nuclear and limited-war theory were and remain controversial; academics, bureaucrats, and other members of the defense establishment have taken a variety of positions and disagreed openly, often bitterly.

In sharp contrast, systems analysis, the third type of strategic thought, has met with little intellectual resistance since its introduction in the early 1960s. The systems analysts did encounter opposition, of course, from such men as S.L.A. Marshall, Admiral Hyman Rickover, General Curtis LeMay, and Hanson Baldwin, but their criticism was rarely thorough, because they dwelt on the arrogance of the practitioners of systems analysis and particular failures of their art, rather than on the theory itself. The analysts, in turn, dismissed the opposition as the product of parochialism, intellectual sloth, and even cranky senility. In addition to a store of telling *ad hominem* invective, the systems analysts possessed two further defenses. The first was their willingness to denounce "bad analysis," even their own, a tactic that deflected theoretical arguments. In addition, the systems analysts were social scientists and benefited from the reputation of value-free social science. This ensured their popularity with those social and natural scientists who make up the bulk of this country's strategists and students of military affairs. Unlike other countries, the United States has few historians of war or military men of letters who could have replied cogently and publicly to this application of modern social science to the problems of war and war-planning. Thus, for nearly two decades systems analysis has escaped the critical examination it deserves.



The roots of systems analysis lie in economics: The early systems analysts, including Charles Hitch, Roland McKean, and Alain Enthoven, were in fact economists, many of them from the Rand Corporation. According to them, "choosing strategies and weapon systems is fundamentally an economic problem, using the term in its precise sense." Systems analysis is therefore independent and far reaching. "In the economists' world there are always alternatives, alternative ways of using resources or doing a job." The systems analyst is a critic and an entrepreneur—not an occasionally useful but subordinate expert.

The most important tool of systems analysis is cost-effectiveness, an economist's way of posing a problem and suggesting a proper solution. Cost-effectiveness (or cost-benefit analysis as it is sometimes called) asks either "Given a fixed sum of money, how can we buy the most effectiveness (or utility)?" or "Given a certain desired level of effectiveness, what is the cheapest method of achieving it?" If they phrase the question the first way, those who have the final say about buying weapons and devising strategy must make arbitrary and rigid decisions about how much money to spend, but do not need refined measures of benefit. The systems analysts do not, by and large, approve of such an irrational method of administration as fixing expenditure and then trying to buy the most one can within a given budget. They prefer the second approach, that is, to discover what is sufficient and then find the cheapest way of procuring it. Hence their preoccupation with the question, "how much is enough?"—the title, in fact, of Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith's history of their experiences as two of McNamara's systems analysts. ➞

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Enthoven gives a good example of the cost-effectiveness approach by describing the logic of McNamara's preference (during the early 1960s) for a conventional over a nuclear aircraft carrier—the *John F. Kennedy*, or CVA-67. Enthoven put the problem this way: A conventional carrier costs $280 million, a nuclear carrier costs $400 million, and the four destroyer escorts needed to protect an aircraft carrier cost roughly $120 million. The systems analysts devised measures of effectiveness (sorties per time period, airplane load, etc.) and attempted to discover the cheapest way of buying a certain level of effectiveness. They willingly reformulated the problem, however: Given $400 million dollars, which choice offered more effectiveness, the conventional carrier plus four escorts, or the nuclear carrier without? They rejected the notion that Congress could decide to buy the nuclear carrier because it believed it worth the price, and then raise additional funds for four destroyers. The choice under such conditions, according to McNamara's advisers, would have to be between the effectiveness of a nuclear ship with four escorts and a conventional vessel with eight.

In both formulations cost-effectiveness disregards reality. First, if we use the fixed-cost-maximum-benefit method, we disregard political reality. Political choice is not economically rational: Additional funds may be available to enhance the power and prestige of the U.S. Navy by funding a nuclear aircraft carrier; these monies might not be available to purchase four more destroyers. The choice from Congress's point of view was indeed between a nuclear carrier with four escorts and a conventional carrier with four escorts; annoyed legislators told the analysts as much. If we adopt the second variant of cost effectiveness—fixed effectiveness least cost—we must have extraordinary, indeed unobtainable measures of benefit, measures which take into account all of the conceivable political and military contexts in which a carrier might be used, and the new and different kinds of tactics and strategy that a nuclear carrier could make possible.

The fixed-effectiveness-least-cost formulation narrows the focus of analysis: It prevents the strategist from appreciating the need for flexible weapons and tactics. McNamara declared that he needed to know "the military effectiveness and the cost of a B-52 squadron as it relates to a Minuteman missile squadron and a Polaris submarine." McNamara's need to define effectiveness—in this case, in terms of nuclear warheads delivered against Soviet targets—led him to disregard the multiple uses of weapons, in this case, the B-52. That strategic bomber was originally supposed to carry only nuclear weapons, but it served as a conventional bomber in Vietnam, a use that was unforeseen and unintended, but wholly successful.

Cost-effectiveness requires simplification. The systems analyst divides up his studies by mission (e.g. anti-tank warfare or interdiction of enemy logistics) or scenario (e.g. a sudden, massive Soviet invasion of West Germany). He defines a set of objectives, usually in the form of percentage attrition of enemy units, and considers different ways of achieving that objective. When a systems analyst defines the problem in terms of a mission, he artificially compartmentalizes war planning and neglects the fact that weapons can do many different things: During World War II, for example, the German eighty-eight millimeter antiaircraft gun was discovered to be a superb antitank weapon and served as such. When the systems analyst works by scenario he may disregard those elements of accident and unforeseeable enemy countermeasures which dominate real war and make nonsense of the best laid plans. In either case, systems analysis leads its practitioners to underestimate the importance of tactics (the deployment of units in battle) and strategy (the direction of battles for the higher purposes of war).



Systems analysis means a way of approaching defense problems, a certain attitude, and thereby includes more than the two techniques described above—the systems analysts themselves say as much. These attitudes or predispositions, however, are often necessary to make cost-effectiveness thinking work.

The most important aspect of systems analysis as a mode of thought is quantification. McNamara defined systems analysis as "quantitative common sense" and his disciples declared that it is better to quantify than to use adjectives, even when numbers must be coaxed or coerced from uncooperative data. When the admirals who supported the nuclear aircraft carrier explained why nuclear power offered military advantages, McNamara asked, "Precisely what does this mean? Does it mean ten percent better or one hundred percent better?" Systems analysts do not need sophisticated computers or knowledge of abstruse higher mathematics, but they do need quantitative measures of military effectiveness, and they think they can devise them. Analysts concede that not everything might be quantifiable, but as James Schlesinger pointed out, "a ritualistic recitation of the danger of excessive quantification characteristically precedes the attempt to push quantitative analysis too far."

Systems analysts also believe in scientific method, and therefore in the superiority of their approach to the methods of procurement used until 1960. To be sure, they admit that "analysis is necessarily incomplete" and "falls short of (natural) scientific research," but systems analysts are proud of this modest awareness of their imperfections. At least, as McNamara put it, they try to "establish a rational foundation as opposed to an emotional foundation" for defense planning. The extraordinary self-confidence of systems analysis derives from this belief that it is scientific.

Further, because of systems analysis's roots in economics, the systems analyst also assigns weight to arguments based on marginal utility. Accustomed to the notion that at a certain point large increases in marginal cost bring negligible increases in utility, he casts a jaundiced eye on the Navy's request for nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. He must be firmly convinced that a 33 percent increase in marginal cost brings a 33 percent increase in utility. But because military utility is hard to measure, and because seemingly minor changes in speed or some other characteristic may add up to qualitative change, the systems analyst is prone to accuse services of "gold-plating" when, in fact, they are not.

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In 1964 then Congressman Melvin Laird belabored McNamara for this sort of failure of systems analysis to account for the military significance of seemingly trivial technical advantages. Japanese air superiority at the beginning of World War II resulted in large part from the ten-mile-per-hour speed advantage of the Zero fighter. Laird argued—and McNamara did not deny—that if the Japanese had bought the Zero according to cost-effectiveness criteria, they might well have decided against an airplane engine capable of such efforts.

The systems analyst regards technology as the controlling element in war:

> The machine gun reduced to irrelevance much of the tactical planning preceding World War I. Armored warfare made a mockery of the assumption on which the Maginot Line was based. The development of naval aviation dealt battleships such a blow that their defenders became a symbol of adherence to outmoded thinking. But the problem is of greater proportion (today) than ever before.

Thus there is no point to the study of military history other than to impress upon ourselves the importance of understanding technological change. Technology today changes faster than ever, therefore the experience of professional military men, who by nature are conservative and cling to outmoded methods of doing things, should not be given much weight. Furthermore, because technology rather than human nature is the most important element in war, the systems analyst defines success in terms of annihilating enemy targets ("attriting," in defense planners' jargon), not in terms of destroying the enemy's will to resist or disrupting the cohesion of his units. The systems analyst describes the battlefield as the FEBA (Forward Edge of Battle Area), a term which seems to preclude operational maneuvers that befuddle or paralyze the enemy by menacing his flanks or slicing his lines of communication.

If we accept systems analysis we must therefore accept three of its fundamental—yet often hidden—propositions. First, there is no distinct field of military or politico-military study and knowledge. Defense planners would, according to the theory of systems analysis, benefit more from an advanced degree in economics than from combat or bureaucratic experience, or knowledge of history. This is so because important measures of success can be reduced to numbers; attachment to a service distorts one's views; the essence of military assessment is evaluation of technology. The title of the foremost systems analysis primer is *Systems Analysis and Policy Planning: Application in Defense;* its authors apply a general method to a particular set of problems—that is, defense planning. Their book and other primers use homely examples of housewives choosing washing machines, farmers pondering which crops to plant, and businessmen picking out limousines, to explain how strategists should select, procure, and deploy the armed forces of the United States.

The second proposition is that we can know how much is enough. *Fortune* magazine asked Secretary McNamara in 1965 whether the defense budget would be higher if the gross national product was one trillion dollars rather than $660 billion. "Certainly not," he replied. The traditional view had been that limits on defense spending follow from the risks a country would accept and the price it was willing to pay for defense, but that because of the unpredictability of war, more intelligent spending would always be better than less.

Finally, the adoption of systems analysis leads us to believe that systems analysis can ultimately direct not merely procurement but strategy as well. Initially, the systems analysts claimed only to concern themselves with weapons procurement, not strategy or tactics. But, if we accept the systems analyst's technology-centered view of war, there is no reason why he should not plan and direct operations whose aim and method is simply calculable attrition. "The systems analyst is the fellow who is likely to be forced to deal with the problem in which the difficulty lies precisely in deciding what ought to be done, not simply in how to do it." Moreover, one cannot design a weapon without predetermining its uses: For example, the armor, engine, and cannon of a tank will dictate in some measure whether one's tactics consist of rapid wheeling maneuvers by masses of vehicles or slower movement conducted by infantry, artillery, and armor operating together. A decision to buy a small aircraft carrier may force the Navy to conduct war according to a defensive strategy, to protect lines of communication rather than attack the enemy. Thus, even if systems analysts did not wish to shape strategy and tactics, they would do so nonetheless.

The spread of systems analysis did not merely shape the way we think about military problems: It affected the distribution of political power in Washington as well. Even before McNamara came to the Pentagon, civilian Secretaries of Defense were consolidating and increasing their control over the armed services. American statesmen had realized that the postwar military establishment, huge by comparison with its pre-1940 predecessor, needed central civilian control. McNamara, however, moved faster and further than previous Secretaries in extending civilian control. This sometimes took absurdly petty forms, as when he proudly announced the "consolidation of eighteen different types and sizes of butcher smocks, four kinds of belt buckles, and six kinds of women's exercise bloomers."

McNamara increased his control of the Defense Department by his own diligent study and investigation, by increasing the size and responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and by introducing program budgeting and systems analysis. The Office of Systems Analysis served McNamara faithfully: Its members were loyal to him alone, and largely because of this soon became "the basic force planners in the whole system."

The introduction of systems analysis, however, had an effect that extended beyond increasing the bureaucratic power of a particular office. Because systems analysis rejected prudential military knowledge, it enabled young civilian analysts to contradict and oppose their military rivals with clean consciences. Their self-confi-

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dence came not from superior knowledge or intuition, but from possession of superior analytic tools. Previously, statesmen who coerced military services into choosing certain weapons, tactics, or strategies did so either on the basis of political considerations or because they had studied and thought through a particular military problem. Winston Churchill and David Lloyd George, for example, imposed innovations on the British Navy (oil-fired engines and the convoy system, respectively), but not on the basis of arcane analytic techniques.

The bureaucratic potency of systems analysis made it attractive even to those civilians who knew its failings. Henry Kissinger, for example, accused McNamara of the following:

> He overemphasized the quantitative aspects of defense planning; by neglecting intangible psychological and political components he aimed for a predictability that was illusory and caused needless strains to our alliances. His eager young associates hid their moral convictions behind a seemingly objective method of analysis which obscured that their questions too often predetermined the answers and that these answers led to a long-term stagnation in our military technology.

Despite such trenchant criticism, however, Kissinger brought K. Wayne Smith, one of the foremost systems analysts, to his national security staff. He used this small systems analysis office to conduct bureaucratic guerrilla warfare against Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, who had reduced the power of the systems analysts.

Curiously enough, the American military, after an initial struggle, made its peace with systems analysis. It did so at first in order to parry the thrusts of the systems analysts working for McNamara: The services created their *own* systems analysis offices, whose assessments rarely concurred with those of McNamara's men, but favored instead pet projects of the services. The appeal of systems analysis went deeper, however. The technological branches of the armed services, particularly the Air Force, were favorably impressed by systems analysis's treatment of technology as the prime determinant of war. The attrition mentality of systems analysis struck a responsive chord in other segments of the military, particularly in the Army. The dominant tradition of the American Army dates back to Ulysses S. Grant and extends through George Marshall and William Westmoreland: It relies on numerical strength and, above all, firepower to grind into oblivion an economically inferior opponent. Moreover, the engineering, problem-solving approach exemplified by West Point was compatible with systems analysis. Finally, and not least important, the military accepted the dominant civilian view of military affairs because most armies, sooner or later, adopt the opinions of the society they fight for. Since World War II the American armed forces have been particularly sensitive to shifts in domestic opinion. Thus, many younger officers have accepted, often enthusiastically, the jargon and frame of mind created by systems analysis, to the dismay of more traditional senior officers.

The systems analysis approach under McNamara produced two beneficial effects. First, the systems analysts urged, and the services endorsed, greater investment in logistical facilities, specifically cargo ships and long-range transport aircraft. Systems analysis favors, as we have noted, a strategy of attrition, and therefore pays attention to the problem of bringing a sufficient number of men and weapons to bear on the enemy.

Secondly, systems analysis led McNamara to consider strategic weaponry apart from other arms, to compare the merits of various strategic weapons, including the Polaris submarine, the Minuteman missile, and the B-52 bomber, apart from the service to which they were attached. True, McNamara ignored the role the B-52 could play as a conventional bomber; nonetheless, he deserves credit for considering strategic nuclear problems as distinct from conventional ones, an effect that the Soviets achieved by establishing a separate military service, the Strategic Rocket Forces. On the other hand, the outcome of McNamara's policies was the same as if the traditional, eclectic, service-oriented approach had obtained; the United States finally invested in land-based, naval, and airborne nuclear weapons.



The introduction of systems analysis had other long-term effects that extended beyond the reinforcement of civilian control and increased attention to logistics and nuclear weaponry. To begin with, the introduction of systems analysis slowed down the acquisition of new weapons. Many of the new weapons associated with the McNamara period were in fact developed during the 1950s—for example, Polaris, Minuteman, the F-111, and the AR-15 rifle.

Systems analysis requires, of course, analysis, the description of a mission and various ways of achieving it, lengthy studies of comparative effectiveness, and so forth. Thus, continual re-evaluation of nuclear versus conventional power added years onto the acquisition of the *Kennedy;* prolonged systems analysis delayed and finally killed the B-1 bomber; a new main battle tank did not appear until 1980—over two decades after the introduction of the M-60. The Laird reforms, which were directed against the systems analysts, ameliorated the problem but did not solve it.

Systems analysis opposes innovation when the changes involved seem to take the form of an expensive version of the current, basic design. According to systems analysis, "the problem of justifying a modification is essentially the same as that of justifying a new development." Thus, systems analysts argued that a nuclear carrier merely performs the same missions that a conventional carrier could carry out more cheaply, that the B-52 could take the place of a new strategic bomber, that a modified M-60 could delay the need for a new tank. Now, in each case the military changes involved were considerable; in each case technological improvement offered a hedge against increases in enemy strength.

Systems analysts favor technological innovation, however, if they believe that a new (usually inexpensive) weapon can fill an old mission. The best and most recent example of this phenomenon is the claim of the systems analysts for precision guided munitions (PGMs), in particular, infantry-carried wire-guided antitank missiles. Their calculations of exchange ratios (e.g. an antitank missile costing some tens of thousands of dollars can destroy a half million dollar tank) suggest that the tank is obsolete: They urge the acquisition of large numbers of such weapons to replace current tank-heavy units. Their recommendations pay little heed to two things: the possibility of counter-measures (e.g. artillery barrages or improved armor design), and the difference between results scored on a test range by a healthy, relaxed, and safe test engineer and what actually happens when a missile is fired on the battlefield by a debilitated, nervous, and frightened soldier.

Systems analysis discourages the study

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of one's opponents, his language, politics, culture, tactics, and leadership. The unit of analysis is the mission or the object: The enemy therefore is often regarded as a passive collection of targets. The attitude is that of the engineer building a bridge across a river, who does not for a moment think that the river will act deliberately in order to thwart him. Alternatively, systems analysis assumes that the enemy resembles us. McNamara suggested that the Air Force train its pilots in combat squadrons, the way the Soviets do: "If it is not viable for us one would conclude that it is not viable for the Soviets." This ignores, of course, differences in equipment, organization, doctrine, and culture. Similarly, military analyses performed by Enthoven of the conventional balance in Central Europe argued that NATO and Warsaw Pact forces were "equal" because both sides had equal numbers of soldiers and artillery tubes—his analysis did not account, again, for all those factors that have traditionally shaped the outcome of war.

Finally, systems analysis leads its practitioners to neglect the importance of politics in the largest sense. During the early stages of the Vietnam war the Office of Systems Analysis did not directly manage the Vietnam war, but the mindset of systems analysis led McNamara to think in terms of "making the costs exceed the benefits" for the North Vietnamese, rather than in terms of breaking the enemy's will and ability to fight, or arranging a political solution to the problem. Henry Kissinger describes how in July 1970, when the Egyptians under Soviet guidance began to move surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to the Suez Canal, systems analysts argued that Israel would make a more cost-effective choice if it bought weapons to repel a cross-canal attack rather than use expensive Phantom jets to destroy the SAMs. Kissinger commented, "These arguments overlooked that a defensive strategy implies a war of attrition, a prospect fundamentally intolerable for a country outnumbered by around thirty to one." In 1971 Kissinger's systems analysts suggested that troops from the Mekong Delta be moved north to participate in operations near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Their plans took no notice of the fact that troops who fought well to defend their homes in the south would desert rather than fight in Laos.

Systems analysts are willing—nay, eager—to condemn defective analysis, but not to re-examine the premises of the whole approach. Yet we must ask whether a method that consistently makes the same mistakes is not inherently flawed. The main criticism of systems analysis, the one that embraces all the others, is that it does not treat war as a unique phenomenon that requires application and experience—real or vicarious—in order to be understood.

We do not argue here against civilian control of the military, nor even against civilian intervention in questions of armament, tactics, and strategy—such intervention is legitimate and necessary; more than once has it saved a great nation from defeat. But control and direction must come from an understanding of war as a complicated and difficult art, not from overweening confidence in the lore of economics. An art critic need not be an artist, but he must appreciate the difficulties of painting and sculpting.

Carl von Clausewitz, the greatest (perhaps the only) philosopher of war knew of approaches that resemble systems analysis. He described, for example, the relative merits of a squadron of cavalry, a battery of artillery, and a battalion of infantry:

> If we could compare the cost of raising and maintaining the various arms with the service each performs in time of war, one would end up with a definite figure that would express the optimum equation in abstract terms. But this is a guessing game . . .

—this, of course, at a time when the technology of war was much simpler than it is today, and therefore theoretically more amenable to systems analysis. Clausewitz continued by assuming that the squadron, battery, and battalion cost the same amount of money: Could we then calculate the optimal cost-effective solution of our military problems?

> It might conceivably be possible if destructiveness were all that had to be measured; but each branch has its own particular use and thus a different sphere of effective action. But the spheres are by no means fixed; they could be expanded or contracted.

Clausewitz therefore decisively rejected systems analysis.

Clausewitz argued that war is partly a science but largely an art, an art that "includes all activities that exist for the sake of war, such as the creation of the fighting forces, their raising, armament, equipment, and training." It is an activity that should always be guided by political intelligence; it is an activity dominated by moral forces because of the dangers it involves. It is intrinsically unpredictable, in large part because of the problem of enemy reaction to our measures at the technical, tactical, strategic, and political levels.

We will find no simple alternative to systems analysis, for indeed, one of systems analysis's worst flaws is its penchant for terrible simplification. We cannot turn to a different, ready-made school of American strategists because the methods of systems analysis have spread throughout the strategic studies community and are no longer confined to a few adepts. We cannot merely reject a technique—we must change a way of thought.

If, as seems likely, this country will face military challenges in the next decade, we must prepare ourselves for uncertainty and sacrifice, and we cannot do so by means of methods that promise predictability and technological fixes. Our technical and numerical superiority did not prevent us from losing the Vietnam war. We may fight our next battle under far less propitious circumstances than in Vietnam; all the more reason, then, to turn away from the study of economics and towards the study of war. □



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John Nollson

BADTIME FOR BONZO

There are some who know more than others about the ongoing political struggle between evolutionists and creationists. But, until now, no one has bothered to seek them out. The most insightful is R. Bonzo himself, the engaging chimpanzee who once starred with Ronald Reagan in a classic Hollywood film. Bonzo did not perish in a tragic fire, as has been erroneously reported. In fact, he himself is the source of those rumors, for he feared that reporters would set upon him and give him no rest now that his former co-star is a prominent political figure. These days, Bonzo prefers to live quietly. He shares a large condominium in Newport Beach with his old friend, J. Fred Muggs. Muggs, as many remember, used to cling lovingly to Dave Garroway on the old "Today" show. Sometimes, he used to cling lovingly to the ever-smiling Jack Lescoulie. Eventually, the three of them were replaced by Tom Brokaw, who is more handsome than all of them put together. Muggs is still bitter about it.

Bonzo offered me some grudging praise since I was the first author to track him down—except for Irving Stone, of course, who spent hours interviewing him while writing a fictionalized account of the life of Charles Darwin. Bonzo explains that he joined the Screen Actors Guild at Reagan's urging. He has a comfortable pension. He stays in touch with other animals of political reputation. He reported that Checkers, Nixon's spaniel, has lapsed into senility but that Fala, Roosevelt's puppy, is still going strong in his sixtieth year. But little Beagle still has to wear a hearing aid to compensate for the damage caused by Lyndon Johnson's rough handling of his ears.

"I'm proud of Ron for the stand he has taken," Bonzo said the other day, as we sat at poolside sipping banana daiquiris. "My great-grandfather was one of the first to challenge Darwin. Back in England, he jumped on Thomas Huxley during one of his pro-evolution lectures. They put the old boy away for that, but we've been getting even ever since."

"How so?" I asked.

"Well," said Bonzo, as he picked up a well-thumbed copy of Loren Eiseley's book *Darwin's Century,* "we Bonzos started the disinformation campaign about Charles Darwin and Alfred Russell Wallace, the notorious Chuck and Al show."

"Were they really lovers?" I wondered aloud.

"Not that," said Bonzo disgustedly. "Much as Chuck and Al were willing to defame us apes, we've never responded in kind. We just spread the word that Chuck plagiarized the whole thing from Al. Since then, the evolutionists have been fighting among themselves and writing nasty letters to each other."

"What's to be gained by that?" I asked reprovingly. "After all, Darwin put apes on the map, affording them the singular honor of being the progenitors of man. I'd think you'd be pleased!"

"We don't want the responsibility," Bonzo said soberly. "Besides, it's a bum rap."

At this point, Muggs, wearing a navy blue blazer, a light blue LaCoste shirt, and a pair of gleaming white trousers, limped out to the table. His hand was a bit shaky as he reached for the cocktail shaker and filled his glass. He took a sip as he studied me.

"Another reporter wanting to know about Reagan and evolution, I suppose," he said with an air of resignation.

"Afraid so," I replied sheepishly.

Muggs stretched out his disproportionately-long right arm and helped himself to one of the hard-boiled eggs which sat in a bowl in the middle of the table. As he picked at the shell, his voice took on a tone of unexpected hostility.

"Every time a politician speaks up for the ape family, you guys set out to ruin him," he said bitterly. "For the first time in 50 years, we're finally getting a bit of attention as a political issue, and you guys are doing your best to smother it. You're trying to stop Ron from speaking out. You're trying to stifle dissent."

"I can't speak for my colleagues," I said firmly, "but all I am trying to do is to get the facts out to the American people."

"Humpf," said Bonzo, revealing his teeth as he curled back his upper lip. "We're just trying to speak up for our species, to defend ourselves from the charge that we are descendents of the lower animals on the one hand and ancestors of the higher animals on the other. We're caught in the middle of this, and the result is predictable: We're finding that many of us have enormous self-esteem problems. Some of us, ashamed of our apehood, are mired in self-hatred because we haven't evolved. I mean, if Darwin is to be believed, some of us, years ago, managed to break out of our condition and make it all the way to the top of the animal kingdom. But for those who feel they've been left behind, well, they take it out on themselves. Chimpanzees, for example, happen to have exquisite table manners, but they succumb to anthropological stereotyping—just like Muggs here—by scattering eggshells all over the place. It's a serious problem in our community. But along comes Governor Reagan, who does nothing more than give us a chance to regain our self-respect as a species, and the left-wing press jumps all over him."

"Left-wing press?" I exclaimed incredulously.

"We know about these things," said Muggs, seconding the suggestion of his friend. "The humanoid ain't been evolved who can pull the wool over the eyes of an ape."

"Touché!" Bonzo cut in. "We weren't born yesterday, and we weren't created yesterday either."

"You see," said Muggs, "it took us a while to sort things out. Years ago, just like everybody else, we used to be Democrats. We were in favor of the welfare state and the progressive income tax. Now we know better. After all, we thought that Darwin would show us the way to true liberation and self-fulfillment. Well, the zoo hasn't withered away as he predicted, and it's only recently that we've been able to recover from the

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bitter disappointment of it all."

"Yes," Bonzo agreed. "I remember when I first raised this subject with Ron many years ago. He used to be a Democrat, you know, and that's why he believed in evolution. But then I pointed out to him that *On the Origin of Species* and the first volume of *Capital* were both published in 1859. This was no accident, no mere coincidence."

"Gee," I was forced to admit, "I never realized that Darwin was a Marxist. That certainly places things in a new light."

"Typical human reasoning," Muggs said impatiently. "That's not the point at all. The real point was that Marx was a Darwinist. Evolution is not a Communist plot; Communism is an evolutionist plot. That is the key difference. When I think of all the time we wasted back in the old days trying to kick the Communists out of the union, when what we really should have been doing was going after the evolutionists, why, it's enough to make a grown chimp weep."

And, with that, he did indeed begin to weep, taking several minutes to regain his composure.

"After all these years, we're finally on the right track," he resumed, "and this time we're not about to fail."

I was much encouraged by the upbeat tone the interview had taken and I thought it an appropriate time to depart.

Bonzo and Muggs very graciously provided directions to Marineland of the Pacific where, they assured me, there were several intelligent and articulate dolphins who would confirm everything they had said. □

A HANDBOOK FOR MAIDENS

by John Simon

What, one might well ask, does the sacrifice of a few words matter as long as the social fabric is strengthened thereby? Bear in mind, however, that no change ever stops *there,* wherever the particular *there* may be. Take the case of feminist English and its demands from, and depredations on, Standard English. Take, for example, the war on the masculine pronoun in its all-encompassing sense. Whole treatises have been written by feminists to prove the enormous psychic damage done to women by the grammatical masculinity of *everyone* and *anyone*—by our saying, for instance, "Everyone was in his place" or "Anyone can make up his own mind," and the like. Such usage has allegedly convinced countless women through history that they were second-class citizens, excluded from full participation in humankind or, as male supremacists through the ages have called it, mankind. If I were frivolous, I could remark that at least half of such statements carry a negative value, and that women might count themselves lucky to be excluded from such asseverations as "Everyone is dumber than he ought to be" or "Anyone can become the victim of his gullibility." But let me be strictly serious.

In the just-published *Handbook of Nonsexist Writing,** Casey Miller and Kate Swift—two journalists who previously collaborated on the book *Words and Women*—have a relatively long chapter on "The Pronoun Problem." I shall address my remarks chiefly to this; to attempt to refute the *Handbook* point by point, I would have to write a book myself and stoop so low as to debate the authors about why I still prefer "manhole cover" to their "utility-hole cover," the kind of casuistry I'd just as soon put a lid on.

Miller and Swift's first point in the representative chapter under discussion is that when the early English grammarians used masculine pronouns in a seemingly bisexual way, they were actually writing "grammars . . . for male readers in an age when few women were literate." This use, therefore, "did not reflect a belief that masculine pronouns could refer to both sexes," our authors claim, on what evidence they do not choose to state. Grammarians, they continue, later invented the so-called "generic" *he* in an attempt to change the long-established English usage (as Miller and Swift call it) of "*they* as a singular pronoun," of which they give quite a few examples from good writers, e.g., Lord Chesterfield's remark, "If a person is born of a gloomy temper . . . they cannot help it." It is not till 1850, however, that "an Act of Parliament gave official sanction to the . . . 'generic' *he*. . . . The new law said, 'words importing the masculine gender shall be deemed and taken to include females.'" The authors conclude that "as a linguistic device imposed on the language rather than a natural development arising from a broad consensus [is there such a thing as a narrow consensus?] 'generic' *he* is fatally flawed."

Miller and Swift then refer to "several recent systematic investigations of how people of both sexes use and understand personal pronouns." They do not tell us, however, how and by whom these investigations were conducted; if by committed feminists, the results would most likely reflect what the investigators set out to prove. And who but a committed feminist would conduct such an investigation? The outcome allegedly showed that "at all levels of education people whose native tongue is English seem to know that *he, him,* and *his* are gender-specific [lovely word!] and cannot do the double duty" of representing both men and women.

Well, I could go out into the street right now to do a little questioning of my own and find contrary evidence aplenty. For much as our embattled authors advocate such constructions as "I shouldn't like to punish anyone, even if they'd done me wrong" (this from George Eliot), the construction is manifestly illogical and grates on any ear connected to a thinking brain. I do not care how many good writers have at times fallen into such illogic—there simply is no way in which any*one* or every*one* can suddenly multiply, as if it were a rabbit, into a *they*. And not even rabbits could produce parthenogenetically a litter between a main and a subordinate clause. In fact, a logical mind might be thrown by Eliot's sentence, and go looking for some antecedent to *they* other than that inappropriate *anyone*. But, along with like-minded feminists, Miller and Swift insist that "like 'generic' *man,* 'generic' *he* fosters the misconception that the standard human being is male." Isn't it odd that in no non-English-speaking country have women's groups found it necessary to quarrel in this mode with the language for psychopolitical (or is it psychopathological) reasons?

But it isn't odd at all that the only authority of any kind whom Miller and Swift actually quote by name in this section of their book is not a grammarian, linguist, writer, or other word-oriented person, but an obscure psychologist now called Wendy Martyna, though in a book she edited in 1972 she was still Wendy Martin. In their previous collaboration, *Words and Women,* our crusading authors wrote:

> At a meeting of the Modern Language Association the story was told of twin girls who came home from school in tears one day because the teacher had explained the grammatical rule mandating the use of *he* when the referent is indefinite or unknown. What emotions had reduced them to tears? Anger? Humiliation? A sense of injustice? It is unlikely that any woman can recapture her feelings when the arbitrariness of that rule first struck her consciousness: it happened a long time ago, no doubt, and it was only one among many assignments to secondary status."

Now, I ask you, who shall prevail? Those unnamed twins whose eyes brimmed over with tears of anger, humiliation, or righteous indignation at such organized grammatical misogyny, or the tradition of good English that has functioned for centuries, that accords with other Indo-European languages, and that, despite the unrecapturable feelings

*Lippincott, $8.95.

John Simon is the author, most recently, of Paradigms Lost.

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of any woman, did not condemn her to secondary status, but allowed her to become Jane Austen or George Eliot, or even Casey Miller or Kate Swift. Note, however, the inconsistency of the latter two when, in *The Handbook of Nonsexist Writing,* they argue that *because* in the past the prescriptive grammarians permitted the plural *you* to become singular as well and displace *thou,* nowadays the plural *they* should be allowed, *in spite of* the grammarians, to become singularized when necessary, or when the feminists deem it so. And what, pray, has happened to the "broad consensus" that was said to be required to justify such a change? Superseded, perhaps, by a consensus of broads.

We would not be in serious danger from Miller, Swift, and their sorority if we still had prescriptive grammarians, if the vast majority of linguists and lexicographers were not of the descriptive and permissive persuasion that abrogates the right to pronounce one usage correct and another incorrect. The reason is political. One wants to be the champion of progressive causes, repressed minorities—in short, the People—and so takes it out on the English language. One cannot get remuneration, votes, or even a pat on the back from the language; but there is abundant recognition and remuneration for taking up the cudgels for the People and bludgeoning the language, logic, even mere common sense, with them. What Miller and Swift conveniently overlook is the price we have paid for losing our second-person-singular pronominal form. Both in life and in literature, the switch from *you* (formal) to *thou* (informal and intimate), or back again, carried enormous emotional impact. Gone, all gone!

Although Miller and Swift are perfectly satisfied with the singular *they,* another solution also holds evident appeal for them. They cite at length and with palpable approbation recent attempts to coin "a new sex-inclusive singular pronoun." From "myriad suggestions," they adduce *co, E, tey,* and *hesh;* as well as *na,* from a novel by June Arnold, and *person* or *per,* from a book by Marge Piercy. They even reach back to the nineteenth-century eccentric Charles Converse, who proposed *thon* (a contraction of *that one*), and approvingly mention the new supervisors' guide of American Management Associations, published by AMACOM (which sounds like some dreadful film from Fellini's artistic dotage), in which *hir* is used "as a common-gender pronoun meaning he or she." "In a cogent introductory statement," our authors report, "the publishers explain the purpose of the innovation and the reasons for their selection of *hir.*"

Consider now a simple sentence, say, "Everyone must do his duty," which could become, "Everyone must do *co* [or *E, tey, hesh*] duty." Or it could become "everyone must do *na* [or *person, per, thon, hir*] duty." I can envision a time when someone casually saying "na duty" to someone who usually says "hesh duty" will be overheard by someone else who uses "tey duty" in the presence of yet another accustomed to "hir duty"—and the result will, of course, be Babel. Unless perhaps an Act of Parliament, or some other such legislation, mandates (or, more properly, womandates) one of these pronouns into law. But since Miller and Swift are against such legislation, could this happen? Possibly, because it is in the nature of radicals who bitterly oppose laws that disagree with them to foist equally or more restrictive laws on people of another persuasion.

Still, you might interject, where is the danger in making a few footling concessions if the result is peace in the republic? The danger is in that small concessions lead to big ones, that a few concessions lead to many, that one type of concession may encourage demands of quite a different type, and that the result will be chaos. Remember the great couplet from Pope's *Essay on Criticism:* "Our sons their fathers' failing language see,/And such as Chaucer is, shall Dryden be." Do you grasp the full implications of this? Thanks to changes in our language—some in the cause of simplification, but many more based on political interest or sheer ignorance—Shakespeare is already beyond the reach of most people, Chaucer has to be read in second-rate modernizations, and Dryden, for the amplitude and elegance of his rhetoric, is not read at all.

There are two further problems with Miller and Swift's position. One is self-contradiction and consequent wishy-washiness. Take the question of *girl* versus *woman.* Miller and Swift first define their attitude thus: "A person may appropriately be called 'a girl' until her middle or late teens. After that, although her family and close friends may go on calling her a girl with impunity, most red-blooded women find the term offensive." This, even aside from ending with a sentence that does not parse, is curious. Why wouldn't a girl of twenty or twenty-two, regardless of the color of her blood, exult in her girlhood, than which there is no lovelier condition known to humanity? Think only of what poets, novelists, painters, and sculptors—male and female—have done to glorify the term "girl"; if the word becomes synonymous with "child," all their works will lose much of their meaning and beauty. The only reason "boy" is not coextensive in age with "girl" is that, unfortunately, there are pressures on males to go out and make a

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

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living before they have had the time to become "men," and they duly turn into charmless, premature adults lacking that sense of the child in man that Nietzsche rightly admired. That a female could remain much longer like unto the lilies of the field—having, perhaps, to spin a little, but, with luck, not toil at all—was, and still can be, a piece of good fortune for the loss of which the title "woman," with its real or implied responsibilities, is hardly adequate compensation.

But if "girl" applied to a person of nineteen or more is indeed something that makes red blood boil (blue blood, clearly, is immune to this demotic disorder)—if, in other words, it is an insult, an indecency, why is it all right for friends and kinfolk to use such filthy language to a woman of twenty? A few pages later, though, our authors go back even on their "late teens" deadline and cite with approval a reference to "young women in the thirteen-to-sixteen-year age-group." Clearly, this is the same kind of upgrading that turns undertakers into funeral directors, garbage collectors into sanitation workers, maids into household technicians—in other words, part of that self-serving, unrealistic procedure that tries to exalt the humdrum, and thus contributes to the confusion of meanings, debasement of values, and erosion of notions of excellence. And all this for a chimera; the workman who collects garbage will smell no sweeter even if it becomes compulsory to call him Philosopher King.

Inconsistency is everywhere. The feminine ending *-ess* is not acceptable to women who, it seems, must be called actors and sculptors, not actresses and sculptresses; but *alumnae,* with its feminine ending, is a must to women who would feel discriminated against if subsumed under *alumni.* "Goddess" is not only permissible, however, but may indeed become preferable to the Christian God with his chauvinistic maleness. Yet if women consider themselves included under "actors" and "Sculptors," why do they feel excluded by "everyman" or "journeyman" or other such no longer masculine endings? Contradictions proliferate; even Saint Joan is no longer to be known as a heroine but as a hero. Poor girl—or woman: The Inquisition forced feminine clothing on her thus exposing her to the lust of her jailers; now the sisters are foisting a masculine ending on her, thus depriving her of the double glory of being simultaneously a female and a leader.

Finally, Miller, Swift, and their likes have no sense of euphony, of the sound words make. They wonder what is wrong with "repairer" for repairman and "launderer" for launderyman. You have to be pretty monomaniacal and tone-deaf to ignore the ugliness of *repairer* and of the *erer* in *launderer. Laundress* is presumably unacceptable because of the feminine ending. It is hard to resist the conclusion that feminists either hate their feminity or smart under their lack of feminine comeliness—unhealthy situations both.

However that may be, by allowing irresponsible alterations in the language, we are not only losing the necessary touch with the glories of our literary past, we are also inviting a linguistic turmoil that must lead to the breakdown of everyday communication in the not so distant future. □

PRESSWATCH

SUNNI DAYS

by Michael Ledeen

Everyone's favorite ayatollah suddenly found that there are rulers in the Middle East that do not take kindly to calls for their removal. The Shah, despite his reputation for bloody repression, was a passive victim of Khomeini's revolution in Iran, and the Ayatollah made no attempt to mask his imperialistic ambition to extend the boundaries of his Shi'ite revolution to the entire Moslem world. This doctrine, preached from the mosques and radios of Iran ever since February 1979, had taken concrete form in Iraq, where Khomeini had explicitly called upon the local Shi'ites—more than half the population—to overthrow the regime of President Assad. Iraq did not adopt the "human rights" solution so dear to the hearts of Carter loyalists (according to which the followers of the Ayatollah get full civil liberties, are not subjected to tear gas or arrest, and are encouraged to form political parties), and invaded Iran.

This seems simple enough, but American journalists preferred to "go academic" and offer learned sermons on sixteenth-century conflicts between the Ottoman and Persian Empires, and even on the seventh-century division between Sunni and Shi'ite Islam. As a result, Khomeini's explicit attempt to destroy the current (Sunni) regime in Baghdad got lost in the verbiage. A.O. Sulzberger, Jr., for example, noted the Sunni-Shi'ite conflict, observed that it had gotten worse since the Iranian revolution, and then dryly wrote, "statements by Ayatollah Khomeini urging the Iraqi Shiites to overthrow their 'satanic' Government has [sic] further disrupted Iraqi-Iranian relations."

The best analysis came from the *Washington Post*'s William Branigin, who spelled it out clearly: "After he returned to Iran in triumph in February 1979 (Khomeini) set about encouraging Iraqi Shiites . . . to rise against their Sunni Moslen leaders." But even Branigin gives insufficient weight to the very nature of the Khomeini revolution: It is a pan-Islamic movement, claiming hegemony over all of the Muslim world.

The worst treatment comes from Don A. Schanche of the *Los Angeles Times,* a newspaper that in my view is about the best in the country these days. Schanche produced a pure thumb-sucker from Cairo, an interview with "a Western scholar who has lived in both Iran and Iraq." This scholar gave us the bread-and-circuses theory of history: "Both nations have the same urgent need to divert attention from devastating domestic problems, so they make war. . . . But Iraq had extra reasons, so it started the war."

One would have hoped that at some point, the American analysts would have noticed that none of this happened when the Shah was in power, and speculated that perhaps Carter's foreign policy was in some way related to the new catastrophe. But I did not see this written anywhere, at least in the first week of fighting.

Inaccuracy in Media: The award for worst one-liner of the month goes to Frank Reynolds of ABC Television News, who on the night of 16 September reported that Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, former chief of naval operations (and now in the Reagan organization) accused David Aaron of the National Security Council staff of leaking the story of the "Stealth Bomber" to the *Washington Post.* Reynolds then said: "ABC News has learned that the *Washington Post* will report tomorrow that Zumwalt's accusation against Aaron is innaccurate." Got it? The *Washington Post* investigated, found that Zumwalt was wrong, and printed a news story about it, right? Wrong. The *Post*—along with just about every other paper following the "Stealth" story—carried a White House denial of Zumwalt's charges. No news story at all. Just a denial from Aaron's colleagues and friends. Shame on you, Frank Reynolds.

The FBI in Peace and War: If you want to learn how the American press really works, follow the accounts of the trial of former FBI officials Felt and Miller, at this writing under way in Washington, D.C. These two unfortunate gentlemen are accused of conspiring to violate the civil rights of the Weathermen some years ago, and the trial has attracted considerable interest because they are threatening to "tell all": that is, explain why the FBI felt the Weathermen were a serious threat, and had to be kept under unusually close surveillance. The government is queasy about the trial because delicate secrets—as they say—may emerge, and this prompts long whispered conversations between the judge and

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the lawyers. The trial should be a long one. On September 23, an FBI agent who worked for the two confirmed that he had "surreptitiously entered" various New York apartments in an effort to apprehend two fugitives, wanted for bombings in Washington. These break-ins took place without benefit of search warrant, and of course without advising the owners of the apartments in question. The FBI agent—a Mr. Vermeersch—was asked about the break-ins. Here is what the *Los Angeles Times* had to say:

> . . . Vermeersch seemed taken aback when Nields asked what legal authority he had to enter the apartment of Frances Schreiberg, a lawyer with ties to Jennifer Dohrn, sister of Weather Underground Fugitive Bernardine Dohrn.
>
> "Did you have a search warrant?" Nields asked.
>
> "Absolutely not," Vermeersch said. "This was a surreptitious entry."
>
> "Did you have Fran Shreiberg's consent?" Nields asked.
>
> "Absolutely not," Vermeersch responded.

Now consider the *New York Times:*

> The chief prosecutor, (Nields) asked Mr. Vermeersch these questions about a break-in at the Brooklyn apartment of Jennifer Dohrn, the sister of a leading Weatherman fugitive:
>
> Q: Did you have a search warrant?
>
> A: Oh, no.
>
> Q: Did you have the consent of any occupant?
>
> A: No, of course not.

As you can see, quite a discrepancy! *Los Angeles Times*man Ronald J. Ostrow thinks the apartment belonged to Shreiberg, while *New York Times*man Robert Pear thinks it was Dohrn's place. And the emphasis of Vermeersch's reply is quite different in the two accounts: Ostrow portrays the FBI official as indignant that anyone would believe he had confused surreptitious entry with a legal search, while Pear paints Vermeersch as rather sullen and almost reticent.

The *New York Times* account simply describes the exchange between the two, notes that the two fugitives were not located as a result of the break-ins, and says, "Miss Dohrn had not been formally accused of any crime and no warrant had been issued for her arrest, Mr. Vermeersch said. The bureau was looking for clues to the whereabouts of her sister, Bernardine, for whom an arrest warrant had been issued." In other words, the FBI was looking for Bernardine, and entered her sister's apartment to find something out about Bernardine's whereabouts.

Is that all? No, as the *Los Angeles Times'* account spells out:

> Schreiberg was not wanted for a crime, Vermeersch said. But he added that an item of hers had been found in March, 1970, in the rubble of a Greenwich Village townhouse that was blown up as Weather Underground members tried to build bombs there.
>
> Vermeersch, as Nields tried to cut him off, also cited "information in the (FBI) file that Shreiberg had traveled to Paris during the (Vietnam War) peace talks, and the information was that she had made a cash donation to the Provisional Revolutionary Government—the Viet Cong—as well as transferring documents to them."
>
> At a lunchtime press conference on the stairs of the federal courthouse, Judith Clark, one of the break-in victims, denounced both the defense and prosecution in the case. She said the victims "are being put on trial, not the FBI criminals."

To sum up: The *Los Angeles Times* gave us the full—and accurate—account, including the reasons for the break-ins, and the reaction of the defendants. The *New York Times* just gave us a "formula" story: FBI breaks into an apartment illegally.

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

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Month: A thumb suitable for sucking goes to Dusko Doder of the *Washington Post,* for his 11 September article entitled "Soviets' Global Position Eroding." Three columns wide, the "story" is an account of a conversation with "senior Western diplomats" in Moscow, according to whom the poor Soviet Union is in deep trouble. In fact, the Kremlin was said to see itself "surrounded by overtly or covertly hostile forces and left without friends on the vast Asian continent with the exception of India and Vietnam." To make matters even worse, "even Soviets privately concede that both India and Vietnam draw far greater benefits from these ties than does the Soviet Union."

This, of course, is the official Moscow apology for each new act of aggression, as it has been for every imperialist throughout history. One continues to be shocked at the exploitation of American newsprint for Soviet nonsense, and Doder's "senior Western diplomats" appear to have memorized *Pravda:*

> the Camp David Peace process . . . re-established U.S. positions in the Middle East and effectively denied Moscow a voice in the course of events there . . . the Soviet Union, while it has begun to export military power through the use of Cuban and Vietnamese proxies, remains a profoundly old-fashioned empire that regards territories contiguous to its own with greater concern than far away places. . . . The Afghan push . . . is an effort to break what Moscow sees as the hostile ring around the Soviet Union . . . the men in the Kremlin seem deeply troubled by a series of adverse events and by the threat of a new round in the arms race that would put additional strain on their economy.

All this at a time when the Soviets are dazzled by a surfeit of tempting opportunities, and after a decade and a half of uninterrupted expansion of military spending. Make it two thumbs for Doder and the *Post.* □

EUROPEAN DOCUMENT

WHAT SHOULD THE WEST DO?

by Jean-François Revel

The Polish people are not counting on much support from the West. This explains their remarkable caution, as well as the contradictions of their endeavor, which Jacek Kuroń, leader of KOR (Committee for the Defense of the Workers), defined, as he emerged from prison, this way: "We must enlarge the sphere of freedom and reduce the sphere of totalitarianism without crossing the lines drawn by Soviet tanks." The Western governments displayed extreme reserve, even verbally, aware that any encouragement to the Polish strikers from them would provide the Soviets with an excuse to cry out about an imperialist plot. Naturally, this moderation did not prevent the Soviets from doing just that.

Yet, it is not Western moderation that is keeping the USSR from intervening militarily; rather it is the correlation of forces—the probable resistance of the Polish people, including, even, the Army. It is also, after all, the Kremlin leaders' knowledge that, after the invasion of Afghanistan, two colonial wars in less than a year would be a little much. Following some desultory complaints, the West accepted the Afghan affair. Thanks to France, the Olympics turned out to be moderately successful as propaganda. So why mess things up in Poland? The Russians are chess players: They know what a gambit is. It is sometimes best to sacrifice a piece, in view of ultimately winning the game.

But, in this global game, should the West continue to disallow itself from taking advantage of the weaknesses of the Communist side? When problems appear in the West, the Soviets do their best to make them worse. When problems appear in the East, Westerners do their best to solve them. What's more, the Soviets have means at their disposal to exacerbate our internal conflicts, while we have no such means.

With regard to Central Europe, the West has displayed, since 1945, a timidity that has often caused it to make concessions that the Soviets have actually not expected. As Kissinger notes in his memoirs, Stalin, at first, did not expect to be able to grab all of Eastern Europe and turn it into a satellite zone. His early moves after the war—such as accepting free elections in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which the Communists lost—proved that in these countries he was prepared to be satisfied temporarily with a situation similar to the one in Finland. Only afterwards, noting the blatant lack of interest in the West, did he set into motion the series of coups which brought socialism to power in Central Europe and erected the Iron Curtain.

When, having tasted Communism for a few years, the peoples of the satellite countries began to rebel, the West once again underestimated its own assets and overestimated Soviet determination. Who today remembers that during the 1953 working-class riots in Berlin, Beria (still the strong man in the Politburo, just after the death of Stalin) even considered letting East Germany go? During the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, Western governments offered repeated encouragement to the revolutionaries only to follow up with a spectacular and complete abandonment. After the rebellion was crushed, Eisenhower sent his Vice President, Richard Nixon, on a symbolic visit to the refugee camps in Vienna—but not to Budapest. The condemnation of the USSR in the UN resulted of course in no action. As François Fejtö writes in *Budapest 1956,* "There was a big gap between the virulently anti-Communist and interventionist propaganda broadcast by Radio Free Europe and Washington's concrete diplomatic activity."

Since then, this gap has been closed. Our words are now consistent with our actions—like the latter, they are inexistent or insignificant, at least at the official level. This was seen when the Czechs were crushed in 1968, and in 1980 when there was fear of Soviet intervention in Poland. What's more, between these two dates, the West presented the Soviet Union with a royal gift: the official recognition in the 1975 Helsinki Accords of the Soviets' sphere of influence in Central Europe. We have just proven that we respect these accords, since we did not even use the weapons of propaganda at the height of events in Poland. These weapons, at any rate, would have hampered rather than helped the strikers in their skillful and delicate maneuvers.

In theory, it was possible for the West in 1956 and even in 1968 to answer with an intervention of its own, or at least with a preventive warning or a threat to help the resisters. Today none of this is possible even theoretically. The only leverage still left to us in influencing events beyond the Iron Curtain is economics. Should we continue to help Communist regimes to overcome their difficulties or should we simply let them pay the price for their economic ineptitude? The first alternative, in addition to offering us some economic advantages, aims at preventing the Soviet world from undergoing an implosion whose external repercussions could be dangerous. The second alternative would aim at letting the system collapse under the weight of its problems. The current policy, subsidized détente, raises two questions: Does it not nourish Soviet armament? Does it not help the totalitarian powers to maintain themselves rather than improve their peoples' standard of living? Should we help men live or should we help governments oppress men?

We would be making a big mistake if we forgot that totalitarian regimes, too, are fragile. They cannot provide material well-being or individual freedom or political democracy. In Poland and elsewhere, tomorrow just as yesterday, there will always be times when we will have to choose between governments and peoples, between the camp of the colonizer and of the colonized. □

Jean-François Revel is a columnist for L'Express *magazine, from which this essay is reprinted.*

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BOOK REVIEWS

CRIMINALS AND VICTIMS
Lois G. Forer / Norton / $14.95

Joseph W. Bishop, Jr.

Criminals and Victims is the latest addition to the extensive library stacks of books that attempt to expound their authors' notions on the causes and cures of crime, particularly violent crime. Its quality is probably somewhat above the average, for Mrs. Forer's point of view is that of an experienced trial judge in a busy Philadelphia criminal court. (The Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas tries civil cases too, but Judge Forer has little to say about this end of her business.) Her vantage point differs significantly, as of course it should, from those of the prosecutor, the criminal, and the victim—all of whom have written books, too. Her vision is closer to stereoscopic than theirs. Her instincts and inclinations are "liberal," but she is one more demonstration of the fact that even the warmest and most compassionate sympathy for criminals is unlikely to survive prolonged experience of them and their victims. (I have known more than one liberal appointee to the bench who found himself, much to his own surprise, handing out stiff raps without a single pang of conscience.) There is some sense in *Criminals and Victims,* along with a somewhat smaller quantity of nonsense.

An example of sense: She knows that even the most profound and incomprehensible legal philosophers, criminologists, and sociologists are of small use to a judge who has to decide what to do with a flesh-and-blood criminal standing before her—for instance, a welfare cheat of whom the prosecutor would like to make a horrible example, but who is a good mother to her numerous (and, of course, fatherless) offspring. What would happen to them while she does six months in the cooler? Another example: Unlike the learned and progressive draftsmen of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, she knows that "rehabilitation" is rarely a justification for punishment. As a practical matter, the only treatment guaranteed to cure the average convict of his criminous proclivities is a stretched neck. She argues that the ideal punishment would also compensate the victim, by setting the criminal to productive labor, with a substantial part of his earnings being turned over to his victim. Few would disagree. But the idea is not really very useful, for (as she recognizes, when she comes down to earth after a euphoric description of a case in which the idea actually worked) only a minuscule percentage of violent criminals are employed or employable.

The idea might work if, say, manufacturers could establish assembly lines in penitentiaries, with inmates receiving at least the minimum hourly wage and more if they deserve it. Their wages (less a reasonable percentage to give some incentive to the convicts) would go to a general fund for the compensation of victims, including the victims of crimes whose perpetrators are unknown (that is, most crimes) or crimes with no particular, identifiable victim, such as the wholesaling of heroin. Convicts who found the idea of daily labor cruel and unusual and indignantly refused to cooperate might be given the alternative of solitary confinement and/or bread and water. Judge Forer does not extend her idea to such a logical conclusion. Even if such a thought crossed her mind she is an experienced enough politician to recognize its total impossibility. For one thing, liberals would be quick to point out a superficial but unpleasant resemblance to Krupp's use of concentration camp labor forty years ago. There are, of course, obvious differences between forcing men who are guilty of no crime to labor under inhuman conditions for no wages and such prison labor as above suggested: The Thirteenth Amendment forbids "involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." But emotional humanitarians, of whom there are still millions, would treat such distinctions as mere sophistry. More to the point, so long as honest dues-payers cannot find jobs, unions would bitterly and successfully resist private employers' use of prison labor. We are left with the traditional license plates and mailbags, which are not enough to keep busy even that small part of the criminal population which is actually apprehended, convicted, and jailed.

A final example of Mrs. Forer's better sense is, as a practical matter, similarly flawed. "It is apparent to me," she pronounces, "that the way to reduce street crime in the cities is to raise the level of literacy and education so that we do not have a large population of idle, unemployed young men who find themselves deprived of all the desirable material things they see around them." This is possibly or probably true, but how do you do it? The evidence does not support the idea that the ignorance and illiteracy of slum youth is the fault of the schools and teachers. Uncounted billions have been spent on urban schools, far more than was ever spent on the slum children of 50 or 100 years ago—most of whom became educated, productive, and law-abiding men and women.

The plain fact, which Judge Forer, like most liberals, overlooks, is that the slum of 1980—which they usually call a "ghetto"—is a fundamentally different and more hopeless place than the slum of 1850 or 1880 or 1920. The poor immigrant families of the past desperately wanted their children to rise in the world and were convinced that they could do it by education, thrift, and hard work. To this end they labored in sweatshops or with picks, shovels, and hods. The Welfare Mom of today does not typically inculcate in her children the Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish work ethic. They get their values from their peers, and their peers do not see much point in school work. The schools are there, but they cannot educate children who do not come to school or who, if they do come, do not try to learn. Moreover, even if the slum youth does take the education which is offered him, he may still have trouble finding a job. Racial discrimination may be one reason, but it is surely not the only one, nor even the most important. It is safe to say that racism is weaker today than it was 20 years ago. In 1960, 24 percent of young (16-19) blacks were unemployed, against 13 percent of their white contemporaries. Today the discrepancy is much greater—37 percent among blacks, 17 percent of whites. (Many experts think that these figures understate the problem. Certainly the percentage is higher among slum blacks than in the black population generally.) Still more dis-

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couraging, the figures demonstrate that while education does improve a young black's chance of employment, the improvement is far from dramatic. The jobless rate for those without high-school degrees is 31 percent, for those with such degrees 21 percent, for those with college degrees 17 percent—whereas only 16 percent of white high-school dropouts are unemployed. Lack of education is plainly not the main reason that so many young blacks are on the street for lack of anything better to do and under overwhelming peer pressure to adopt street culture, where keeping busy means hustling drugs, pimping, stealing with or without violence.

The other reasons, which Judge Forer does not consider, can be concisely stated. Jobs for the unskilled, or even the inexperienced, aren't easy to find in today's central cities. The businesses with the entry-level jobs have moved to the suburbs or the sunbelt. Slum youths can't or won't commute or move to another state for a job that pays only entry-level wages, even if it also offers training and a chance of promotion. The kids on the streets, unlike the kids in the suburbs, don't get jobs through friends who are already working; their friends are also on the street. Nor do they know what skills are saleable: Those who know enough to sign up for machine-shop training can usually get work. Of those who do try to get an education, too many follow a college-preparatory track, don't go to college, and wind up with no marketable skill. By the same token, too many have utterly unrealistic expectations of walking straight into the executive suite and aren't interested in work that they regard as "menial." (This attitude is encouraged by a lot of white liberals, although not, I suspect, by Judge Forer.) Some of these mistakes are, of course, made by young whites, but probably not nearly so often. The Caucasians have the advantage of a long family tradition of finding and keeping jobs: They are job-wise, as the youth from the Welfare Culture is not. These problems are, if anything, harder to solve than getting better education to young potential criminals. The children of the Welfare Culture have no religious or family tradition of work and self-improvement, nor do their white liberal mentors urge such ideas on them—though the Reverend Jesse Jackson does, and with some success. Perhaps it is time for rehabilitation of that half-forgotten and almost disgraced American, Booker T. Washington.

Thus, I am in accord with Mrs. Forer's obvious belief that it is pointless to punish most street criminals for being evil. (Although some crimes are so brutal that one is tempted to think in terms of the instigation of the Devil and retributive justice.) Most slum punks could hardly have become anything but what they are. It is a tribute to human nature that most young slum blacks are *not* criminal, or at least not very criminal. But moral guilt is not really relevant to the problem of crime and punishment in modern, urban America. We do not trap rats because they are wicked, but because they are (from our standpoint) a nuisance and a menace. Similarly we should not lock up muggers and rapists in any spirit of moral condemnation, but simply because their liberty threatens the rest of us, because if punishment can be made reasonably swift and certain (not necessarily harsher), it undoubtedly has a deterrent effect, and perhaps because retribution makes the victim feel that justice has been done. If confinement can help to rehabilitate the convict by teaching him a lawful skill, so much the better. Judge Forer, who overlooks the fact that most crimes go unpunished, downplays the deterrent effect of punishment. She even trots out the hoary chestnut that pickpockets regularly worked the crowds watching hangings. Even if they did, that proves very little about the incidence of crime and the deterrent effect of punishment in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when criminal statistics were virtually non-existent.

On the other hand, Mrs. Forer is full of righteous indignation where white-collar criminals are concerned. She seems to be unclear in her own mind as to the definition of "white collar." She classifies as "white collar," for example, the Brothers Berrigan, who were neither nonviolent nor sophisticated. (I speak of this precious pair in the past tense, because I don't know whether they are still criminally inclined.) In particular, she condemns the relatively lenient sentencing of white, middle- or upper-class convicts, especially "the Watergate felons" who were allowed to keep their "ill-gotten gains." (Actually the motivation of the Watergate crimes was not commercial: Some of the criminals, notably John Dean, made substantial sums by publishing their confessions and the joyful news of their redemption through Jesus, but there was nothing unlawful or "ill-gotten" about their royalties.) On the other hand, she has no criticism of Daniel Ellsberg, that paragon of radical chic, and indeed has the incredible *chutzpah* to berate Rebecca West for say-

Who reads The American Spectator?



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ing of him, "He has violated the law. Now he must pay the penalty." Although I suspect that what really irked Mrs. Forer was Dame Rebecca's disrespect for that self-effacing patriot, the ostensible ground of her criticism is the English writer's deplorable ignorance of law in supposing that for every offense there is a fixed and mandatory penalty. I am quite sure that Dame Rebecca supposed nothing of the sort: She was simply using a common English idiom.

Judge Forer feels that affluent, educated lawbreakers should go to prisons just as unpleasant for periods just as long as poor, black street criminals. This is undoubtedly true if what we want is retribution, and I do myself feel rather vindictive about embezzlers, securities swindlers, and corrupt officeholders. But as a general proposition the incarceration of such offenders is not necessary to the public safety: Most of them cease to be dangerous when they are exposed, though the stiff sentence imposed on Michele Sindona is likely to have a salutary effect on other high financiers who may be tempted to similar acts of fraud and larceny.

The fact is that Judge Forer seems not to know much about white-collar criminals, who probably do not appear in her courtroom very often. She accepts unproven and unprovable assertions with naive credulity. Here is a specimen:

> Corporate and white collar crimes cause *infinitely more havoc, misery and death* than street crimes. These crimes cost at least $400 billion a year. . . . One should include in this category of crimes which are largely unreported and rarely prosecuted a number of other white-dominated groups [sic] such as manufacturers of machinery which is unsafe and causes mutilation and death to countless people; the owners and managers of improperly constructed and operated nuclear plants; and violators of pure food and drug laws whose products cause cancer, physical and mental deformities, and other diseases in tens of thousands of people.

She cites no authority, not even Ralph Nader. If these crimes are largely unreported, how does she know that there are countless, or even tens of thousands of, victims? Wild rhetoric, which she would be too shrewd to believe if it were directed at street crime, she eagerly gulps down when it is directed at Caucasian businessmen.

It may be noted in passing that she quotes Gunnar Myrdal for the proposition that "Negroes [sic] do not commit white collar crimes." (Her use of "[sic]" apparently reflects the hyperliberal notion that the word "Negro" is somehow a racial slur.) The observation was not entirely true even in 1944, for black swindlers were by no means unheard of. But Judge Forer ignores the fact that blacks have in the last couple of decades moved into white-collar crime. The Mafia is not an equal-opportunity employer, at least in its upper echelons, but there are black tycoons, who display considerable administrative and merchandising ability, in the drug, gambling, and prostitution industries. It may also be noted that she seems to know almost nothing about corporations (except that they are evil) and corporation law. "The law permits a corporate officer to reap profits from inside knowledge or from division of stock into different classes so long as there is 'disclosure.'" In the first place information which is disclosed ceases to be "inside." I infer that Judge Forer has managed to remain ignorant of the landmark decision in *SEC* v. *Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.*, which held that a corporate officer (or anyone else) who buys or sells securities on the strength of inside information violates Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and must at a minimum cough up all his profits and perhaps pay damages to every investor who lost money by buying or selling without knowledge of the inside information. The meaning, if any, of the second clause of her sentence, that huge profits can be made by dividing stock into different classes, is beyond me, although I have been teaching corporation law since 1957.

In short, whenever Judge Forer leaves the firm ground of her judicial experience, she is likely to indulge in liberal piffle of the most preposterous variety. One final example. She is outraged by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan's use of the phrase "benign neglect," which she says is "like every oxymoron, as Webster's dictionary declares, 'pointedly foolish.'" Not my Webster, which gives as examples of the oxymoron two phrases which are far from foolish: "thunderous silence" and "sweet sorrow." I suspect that Mrs. Forer, like most liberals (not, however, including Justice Brandeis, who said that "the right to be let alone is the right most valued by civilized men"), believes that it is sinful to leave other people to their own devices, when she obviously knows what is good for them so much better than they do.

All this said, most of *Criminals and Victims* is entertaining, not very heavyweight, reading, and some of it is instructive. I assume that the ordinary reader will not have much trouble sorting out the intelligent parts from the pishposh. □



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Fred Barnes

John B. Anderson, the clean-fingernail presidential candidate, mused early in the fall campaign that Jimmy Carter would soon be "unmasked in all his glory as just another fellow who is using any tactic that he can to hang on to a political job. I think people will catch on that he's not the sweet, little, sanctimonious fellow that he's always wanted people to think he is. He's really a rough, tough, gut-fighting politician."

Well, don't get your hopes up, John. Carter has been unmasked before, with all his petty maneuverings and palpable inadequacies bared, and it has come to naught. He has slithered to safety every time, only to return with a new mask or persona and, to borrow Ronald Reagan's slogan, a new beginning. And for those willing to slog through 546 pages of Carteriana, Betty Glad will reward you with convincing documentation of this, along with a lode of piquant details (for starters, try Carter's recollection of meeting Otis Redding in the 1970s, though the black singer died in 1967). Her book is at once the most impressive of the dozen or so volumes written about Carter—none of the others was a tough act to follow—and a very depressing chronicle indeed.

How, after all, has Jimmy Carter managed to pull off so many escapes? Glad, a professor of political science at the University of Illinois, has a compelling explanation. Carter, in her view, has "an almost uncanny ability to influence how people interpreted him." In 1976, both journalists, especially liberal ones, and voters proved to be susceptible to Carter's forceful personality, goody-goody morality, and uplifting but ambiguous campaign themes. Out of this they projected "fantasies" (her word) about what a great president Carter would be. Hunter Thompson, Tom Wicker, Anthony Lewis, and Norman Mailer were all successfully courted by Carter. Wicker assumed Carter shared his concern for the downtrodden, if only because he and Carter came from small Southern towns. "I feel reasonably sure that I can detect in Jimmy Carter what I long ago recognized in myself—an indelible class sense, ingrained in us while growing up in the South during the Depression, and fundamentally unaltered by later affluence," Wicker wrote. That's not an insight Wicker is likely to boast about these days. Nor is Mailer likely to recall fondly his conclusions after a summer 1976 visit to Plains: "His [Carter's] aura was hardly the same as other people's. Happiness came off him. It was as if he knew that God had given him intelligence and good work that would make sense, and so he could give his strength to the world and get new strength back."

Carter's stance toward opponents had a strong and favorable impact on voters in 1976 and again this year. "For liberals and Northerners, he was the moderate Southern alternative to Wallace—the man who could defeat the Alabaman on his turf and

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remove him as a factor in national politics," Glad writes. "For others Carter was the Southerner who could win and carry out some of the good things Wallace stood for, such as reforming the government in Washington, making it more responsive to the people." Against Teddy Kennedy this year, it was enough for Carter to present himself as a man of "unquestioned character" and unparalleled devotion to family. In the fall campaign, he and his image-makers are flogging the idea that he is brainy, prudent, and tireless. Guess who is dumb, reckless, and lazy!

What is most depressing in all this is the déjà vu aspect. Vague themes and blurred images were the hallmarks of Carter's gubernatorial campaigns in 1966 and 1970, with Carter running as a more-or-less liberal in the first race and as something of a conservative in the second. Glad spells out the dirty tricks and low-road rhetoric of the successful 1970 campaign, but these details are old hat. They were brought out in a famous *Harper's* piece in 1976 entitled "Jimmy Carter's Pathetic Lies." The article threatened to ruin Carter's presidential bid, but he squirmed free by cleverly making the author's credibility and motive the issue.

Just as his Georgia campaigns foreshadowed his presidential drive, so did his mediocre gubernatorial performance presage his White House years. There was a frenzied though meaningless push for government reorganization. There was the breakdown in relations with the legislature. And there were the wildly exaggerated claims. Carter, who purports to be the most successful president this century in getting Congress to vote his way, insisted he pulled more from the Georgia legislature than any other governor. When his reorganization measure passed in dramatically revised form, Carter said it was 95 percent of what he had sought. That statement was as far from reality as Carter's claim as president that the energy bill altered beyond recognition by Congress provided 60 percent of what he wanted.

So the Carter beat goes on, lies and all. Glad suggests that there are a series of untruths which Carter has been spouting over the years. His assertion, in a speech to the American Legion, that his father was a second lieutenant in World War I appears to be false, she says. Nor was Carter a finalist in the selection of Rhodes scholars in 1947 (he lost at the state level), 59th in his class academically at Annapolis (he was 60th), the recipient of an endorsement in 1970 by Senator Richard Russell (Russell vigorously denied it), or heir to a Georgia "plantation" (modest farm is more like it).

For all the clarifying of the Carter record, Glad makes a few minor mistakes of her own. Richard Moe, not Robert Moe, is Vice President Mondale's chief aide. James Fallows becomes Robert Fallows in the source notes. Eleanor Clift is not a *Time* magazine reporter from the South; she is from New York and covers Carter for *Newsweek*. And Greg Schneiders, the former White House aide, did not work for Carter as governor. More serious is Glad's reliance on the silliest and most fawning book about Carter, *How Jimmy Won* by Kandy Stroud, for insights on Carter and his presidential campaign. Better she should have turned to *Dasher* by James Wooten, the best Carter book next to hers. Wooten depicts a Snopesian Carter who is, above all, a hypocrite. Glad leaves one with a stronger word in mind to encapsulate Carter—fraud. But a successful fraud. □

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

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

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

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RADICAL PRINCIPLES

Michael Walzer / Basic Books / $15.00

Mark T. Lilla

If reading the reviews and articles in *Dissent* or the *New York Review* may be likened, at times, to wading in shallow and rather muddy waters, then finding a piece by Michael Walzer in one of these publications is like stepping off a sandbar. On those occasions when I have unexpectedly found myself in these deeper waters, I have had to regain my footing and start all over again, only slower and with more care. I looked forward, then, to the challenge of reading his new collection of essays, most of which were originally printed in the aforementioned journals, and I have not been disappointed. Walzer is unquestionably a man of the (old) American Left, but he is one of the very best it has produced; he is a careful and thoughtful scholar, and heterodox enough to avoid being strident or humorless. The reader may not share his "radical principles" (as I do not), but he will surely profit by reading them expressed so well.

I am enthusiastic about the book because it drove home a point that was becoming more and more evident to me: It has become much easier to be a conservative intellectual. This is not to suggest that the ideas of the Left are widely held in disrepute, or that *The American Spectator* is selling out in newsstands across the country, but in intellectual circles where momentum often matters more than movement it is clear that the tide is turning and that a great number of creative and interesting political minds (both young and not so young) have been repelled by the Left. (Whether they are willing to be labelled conservative or neoconservative is another, and less important, matter.) The virtue of those who were instrumental in turning the tide, and who are now in their salad days, is that they were a product of a reaction against an Old Left which was tough and intellectually rigorous, a Left which has all but disappeared in the intellectual diaspora that followed the eruption of the New Left in the late 1960s.

Younger conservative (or non-left) thinkers are less fortunate than older ones. Rather than having a worthy and august opponent in the Left, they are faced with an odd blend of esoteric Marxist scholasticism, "community organizing," California narcissism, innumerable "rights" groups, and the sort of confused counterculture (no longer so counter) that can be found on contemporary television and in Madison Avenue advertising. It becomes easy, as the last sentence makes evident, for these developments to blend into a *gestalt* which is often carelessly labelled "liberalism" or "modernism" and then quickly rejected. This reaction is understandable and, when paired with a good sense of humor, may be indispensable to surviving our times, but I don't see how it alone can produce the sort of minds and ideas we so desperately need. In one of his novels Walker Percy says there is nothing more dangerous than a Georgia Freudian; our problem is that the country is full of New Jersey Marxists and Missouri Marcusians. The Left has become ubiquitous, but half-witted.

In Walzer the reader will finally find a worthy and challenging opponent on the Left, one who should be read, not only because he puts his case well, but because he shares many of the concerns about the state of contemporary society that have been voiced recently by neoconservatives. Walzer here uses many surprising words, and uses them seriously: civility, republican virtue, citizenship, and patriotism. He is concerned, particularly in his later essays, with the damage that unfettered liberalism may have wrought on our culture. In the introduction he writes that many examples of liberation

> inspire a bleak vision. I imagine a human being thoroughly divorced, freed of parents, spouse, and children, watching pornographic performances in some dark theater, joining (it may be his only membership) this or that odd cult, which he will probably leave in a month or two for another still odder. Is this a liberated human being?

As his writing matured, Walzer also became a vocal and effective critic of the New Left. He is sympathetic with many of its aims, but pointedly denies that any meaningful political action will come out of the barrel of a gun or that police officers are pigs, and during the late sixties and early seventies desperately tried to inject realism and civility into the "movement." To quote: ". . . the counterculture of the sixties was so much a matter of the head: it denied the deepest intimations of our political experience"; or "The prevailing tendency (among liberals too) has been to grant a kind of *carte blanche* to any 'oppressed' group whose militants adopt a radical rhetoric, as if there were no principles by which their particular demands might be judged." And, as gently as possible, he criticizes the "pastoral retreat" of the New Left from active, broad-based politics to self-serving community action groups and other disjointed populist causes.

If many of his concerns and criticisms are attractive, why is Walzer co-editor of *Dissent* rather than a writer for *Commentary?* Those who know Walzer and his writing may be amused by the suggestion, but for those who are unfamiliar with him it should be made clear how these common concerns can lead to radically different conclusions. Although this is a book of essays written over two decades, not a tightly written theoretical work, it is clear that his conclusions share a common overemphasis on the importance of politics in everyday life and a permanent attraction to the socialist dream.

Walzer insists that the culprits who

Mark T. Lilla is Assistant Editor of the Public Interest.

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

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

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have brought us the decline of civic virtue, a loss of shared values, and the current (in his words) "moral laissez faire" are capitalism, liberalism, and the welfare state. This is a rather odd mixture, but the reasoning is straightforward. Capitalism, of course, is always a problem, not just because of class—he rejects that as too simplistic—but because it "privatizes" so much of life, from the workplace (which workers do not control) to the family (which, once affluent, no longer needs the community). Liberalism makes capitalism possible and, while it is still worth retaining and pursuing in many areas (he still talks about winning rights for various groups), it clearly undermines the sort of communal feelings needed in a polity. The struggle for the welfare state was a communal struggle which, in Walzer's eyes, overcame the atomism of liberal capitalism, but no longer engages people in politics. Once constructed, the welfare state becomes another faceless, but far more powerful, enterprise which serves yet rules people without bringing them together for a common purpose. The picture he paints of everyday life is of a worker who spends eight hours in a place he does not control, stops at a pornographic movie (as is his right) on the way to his relatively affluent private home, and expects to collect his Social Security check when he turns 65.

Some of the notes are right, but the song lacks harmony. His conflation of liberalism and capitalism causes problems, particularly when he criticizes neoconservatives for defending aspects of both. Capitalism, of course, has very little to do with the political problems that concern Walzer, yet he makes the obligatory references to worker control (socialism happens "on the shop floor") and the need to politicize work in general to make it meaningful. Defenders of capitalism may refer to Adam Smith's argument: The virtue of capitalism is that it makes people affluent, not happy; happiness and community are important, but are to be received elsewhere. I (and Smith for that matter) will admit that the affluence undercuts many common social values and civility in a society, but that is not due to capitalist "production" as such; affluence, as Catholic theologians have never tired of reminding us, is its own vice. Perhaps in some poor syndicalist country there could be a greater degree of civic virtue, but that would be because it was poor, not because it was socialist.

Liberalism does present problems, but Walzer is wrong to label neoconservatives as "nervous liberals" who fail to see a contradiction between the maintenance of social values and liberal capitalism; there is no contradiction here, but a healthy tension which must be maintained if our society is to remain stable, free, and affluent at the same time. The neoconservative argument has been that that balance is lost as social "liberation" has led to instability and a decline in authority, and as government action to promote equity has muted economic growth. Walzer wants to draw a false dichotomy between a liberal capitalism that is slowly eroding the community and his democratic socialism that might preserve it.

What is missing in most of *Radical Principles* is any recognition of nonpolitical social groups and institutions, what have come to be called "mediating structures": churches, universities, cultural and intellectual groups, etc. (His one essay which deals with this problem, "A Day in the Life of a Socialist Citizen," seems oddly out of place in the book.) It might be crudely said that each of these groups has its own sort of "politics," but I think this fundamentally misunderstands the differences in the nature of action in each realm of social life; each has its own



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logic (or, in Daniel Bell's exotic term, "axial principle"), but Walzer wants to organize *all* realms around politics. (Carl Schmitt has written that politics always divides people into "friends and enemies"; Walzer seems to think we'd all be friends.) He sees a decline in community in general, and wants to "repoliticize American life by getting people involved in all sorts of social organizations, each of which would be "democratically structured." But it is precisely because life became *so* political over the past two decades that many of these non-political communities withered and lost both authority and the respect of their members. There has not been a church, a university, an art fair, a school choir, or a Little League team which has not suffered the onslaught of politics outside its own realm.* Liberalism not only lost its sense of proportion within the polity, it literally gushed out into every nook and cranny of American life; what the other "mediating structures" need is not more politics (of whatever brand), but a long respite. By desiring a repoliticized America, Walzer is like a medieval doctor bleeding an anemic patient.

On the welfare state there is much agreement between Walzer and the neoconservatives, though they end up pointing in different directions. Walzer, in *Dissent* and elsewhere, defended the growth of welfare programs, and still does to some extent, but now makes it clear that making certain people better-off was not his primary goal; what really matters is the kind of democratic socialist organizing which, in his view, led the way to the welfare state but is now smothered by it. He and neoconservatives now ask that the welfare state be "hollowed out," but while neoconservatives would shift the emphasis to local governments and mediating structures, Walzer has in mind new organizations based on "participatory democracy."

I must admit that by the time I got to the final section of essays, titled "Democratic Socialism," I was a bit baffled by just what Walzer means by this term. We are told that "socialists are advocates of community" and that "socialism is the effort to sustain older values within a social structure that accomodates liberated, that is, free and equal individuals"; in that case I am a socialist and so are a great many other unwitting souls. A definition of sorts pops up:

> This is the working principle of democratic socialism: that politics can be opened up, rates of participation significantly increased, decision making really shared, without a full-scale attack on private life and liberal values, without a religious revival or cultural revolution. What is needed is the expansion of the public sphere . . . a new politicizing of the state, a devolution of state power into the hands of ordinary citizens.

Mr. Walzer is hedging. It seems he has a profound understanding of the importance of all the ancient civic virtues and the problems inherent in the blind pursuit of liberty and equality, but he still wants the luxury of invoking "socialism" when he can, and I am not sure why. He is a serious thinker who should be taken seriously, but the best explanation I have of his tenacious hold to socialism is romance. For the socialism Walzer evokes is very old; there are plenty of quotes from Brecht and Whitman here, as well as references to "the Good Old Cause." The position of "neo-wobblies" must be a rather comfortable one these days, for it allows them to criticize Communist states, mainline liberalism, the New Left, and neoconservatives while maintaining their blessed "radical principles" which, in Walzer's case (and probably to his dismay), are not so radical after all. This sort of utopian socialism grows more quaint as

*In the Fall issue of the *Public Interest*, Peter Skerry demonstrates this quite poignantly in his article "Christian Schools vs. the I.R.S."

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION

1. Title of publication: The American Spectator. A. Publication no.: 01488414
2. Date of filing: October 1, 1980.
3. Frequency of issue: Monthly. A. No. of issues published annually: 12 B. Annual subscription price: $15.00.
4. Location of known office of publication: 102 West Sixth Street, Bloomington, Monroe, Indiana 47402.
5. Location of the headquarters or general business offices of the publishers: Same.
6. Names and complete addresses of publisher, editor, and managing editor:
   Publisher: Ronald E. Burr, 102 West Sixth Street, Bloomington, IN 47402.
   Editor: R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., 102 West Sixth Street, Bloomington, IN 47402.
   Managing editor: Wladyslaw Pleszczynski, 102 West Sixth Street, Bloomington, IN 47402.
7. Owner: The Alternative Educational Foundation, Inc., 102 West Sixth Street, Bloomington, Indiana 47402.
8. Known bondholders, mortgages, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities: None.
9. For completion by nonprofit organizations authorized to mail at special rates: The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for Federal income tax purposes have not changed during preceding 12 months.

10. Extent and nature of circulation	Average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months	Actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date
A. Total no. copies printed	27,258	30,400
B. Paid circulation:		
1. Sales through dealers and carriers, street vendors and counter sales	1,206	1,259
2. Mail subscriptions	22,563	25,376
C. Total paid circulation	23,769	26,635
D. Free distribution by mail, carrier or other means, sample, complimentary, and other free copies	805	1,038
E. Total distribution	24,574	27,673
F. Copies not distributed:		
1. Office use, left over, unaccounted, spoiled after printing	1,880	1,888
2. Returns from news agents	804	839
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the years pass and as it rejects many of its own children, but the attraction remains. Michael Walzer is a thoughtful man, but when he mentions socialism I hear echoes of the Montanist Tertullian maintaining his faith before the Platonic rationalists in the early days of the Church: *"Credo quia absurdum"* ("I believe because it is absurd").

For this reason alone, *Radical Principles* should be widely read by those who have left the Left. Walzer has a keen eye for what ails the American polity, and while that eye may distort, that distortion reveals much about men, their politics, and their ideals. The words which best sum up his vision are, I am afraid, Walzer's own when he considers the neoconservatives: "The search is powerfully motivated and often eloquently expressed, but I do not see how it can succeed." □

SPECTATOR'S JOURNAL

On Gusto

Back in the 1950s, when all seemed to be going well for America, the largest-selling beer in America was Schlitz. With its crisp, lightly hopped flavor and especially good aftertaste, it seemed the sort of brew that one could easily imagine thriving forever. Unfortunately, neither Schlitz nor the nation held up as one might have expected. Indeed, the analogy is worth pursuing. Schlitz remained the dominant American brewer until 1958, when it was dethroned by Anheuser-Busch. This approximately marks the beginning of America's decline, although following the analogy Schlitz should have dropped out of first place precisely on January 1, 1959, when Castro took control of Cuba—but then, analogies are never perfect.

Economic history teaches us that once something starts to decline, its downward movement is usually relentless. Schlitz proved no exception. For several years it held up absolutely but declined relatively, remaining a solid second until 1977. But in 1976, even its output began to decline. Schlitz now runs a weak third in the industry, with an output considerably less than half of Anheuser-Busch's. In 1979 it lost over $50 million.

What went wrong? Most important, Schlitz ruined its quality by investing a lot of capital in a fast brewing process: The traditional flavor that was advertised as "just the kiss of the hops" was replaced by a new one that tasted as if the hops were poured in from a bottle. (They probably were.) Schlitz then engaged in some underhanded marketing practices that were subsequently brought into the courts. Finally, its advertising went stale. In an effort to reverse its steady loss of customers, Schlitz adopted a campaign featuring boxers and other heavy types snarling at the prospect of someone's "taking their gusto away." This was thought in the advertising industry to amount to a threat: "Drink Schlitz or I'll kill you."

America fared little better during the same period. In Vietnam our highly capital-intensive military was supposed to win a quick victory. Unfortunately, it didn't work against an opponent willing to wage labor-intensive warfare and do a slow job of that. Our underhanded efforts in support of leaders like the Shah of Iran and Anastasio Somoza didn't work out either. Finally, our threats have proved an absolute disaster, producing the reverse of our intentions in Iran and elsewhere.

One doesn't know how far to push analogies, of course, but it's true that Schlitz lost Hawaii. After buying the Hawaiian Brewing Company, whose Primo Beer had dominated the island market for decades, Schlitz managed to lose that market to Olympia and others, eventually closing its failing Honolulu brewery and withdrawing to the mainland to produce Primo.

Schlitz stays in business independently, mainly because nobody appears willing to merge with it. Its output has fallen, and the company has had to sell its best brewery (in Syracuse, New York) to Anheuser-Busch. Once the Antitrust Division of the FTC decides that Schlitz is a failing enterprise, another brewer could take over the firm without fearing the antitrust laws.

At this point it is probably best not to pursue the analogy any further. Even so, by now we have surely identified what should be the national drink for America in the 1980s. It is Schlitz. Lift one to celebrate America's fortunes. The taste may not be what it was before 1959, but then neither is the nation.

—George W. Hilton

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

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

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CURRENT WISDOM

The 1980 Democratic Convention

The Hon. Ronald V. Dellums, A.A., B.A., M.S.W., caught in one of the most glorious wangdoodles of a shout ever heard at a Democratic Convention. Incidentally, Dr. Dellums served for two years as Psychiatric Social Worker for the California Department of Mental Hygiene, I kid thee not:

Brothers and Sisters of the Democratic Party: A number of people have asked why have we attempted to advance this candidacy. It is simply to mount this podium to suggest to you that we have a moral imperative, a political imperative, an intellectual imperative to stop Ronald Reagan and George Bush from becoming the President and the Vice President of the United States at this critical juncture in the evolution of human life in this country. . . . It is terribly important that you and I, here at this convention, understand that perhaps this is the most dangerous moment in modern life. It is a moment when this country, a time when this convention, a time when our people must stand and discuss the issues of our times. . . . You cannot defeat Ronald Reagan by simply being anti-Ronald Reagan. You cannot defeat Ronald Reagan by moving to the right—we must move to the left in this country. We cannot defeat Ronald Reagan by abandoning our ideals. We *can* defeat Ronald Reagan by advocating a program which rejects the madness of war, that rejects the madness of death and destruction, that rejects the madness of a military budget calculated to destroy this nation. . . . Senator Kennedy stood here in eloquent and extraordinary courage and embraced the idealism that should be this party. . . . What Senator Kennedy was about and what I am about is what will make this country real—speaking to the hopes and the dreams and the aspirations of our people. . . . It is only when we speak to the idealism ot this nation that we will survive. The fact that Senator Kennedy captured the imagination of this audience last night was a reality—that what America's people want are new ideas, new orientations, a sense of idealism, and a sense of hope in this country that we have not moved to the right and dropped off the face of the earth.

Let us rededicate ourselves in the next few hours of this convention to reject war and accept peace—to reject the big military budget and deal with human needs of this country—to reject racism and to embrace humanity—to reject pollution and the exploitation of our environment to (move to) an ecological orientation to human life. I join you in that struggle. I withdraw my candidacy, because I did not come here to seek votes. I came here to seek a platform to energize you and to energize me as we win back our party and win back America.

[*August 13, 1980*]

Esquire

Mr. James Wolcott, writing in a man's magazine, exhibits the painful symptoms of the Anglo-Saxon's traditional low-fiber diet. After middle years, forget not your bran!

The young whippersnappers of *The American Spectator* are also monotonous pounders, mocking those who try to aid the poor and powerless for being (boo, hiss) liberal lemmings. The following announcement in *The Progressive* magazine, a liberal publication, was reprinted in *The Spectator's* Current Wisdom column and labeled "a proud declaration from the lunatic fringe":

For many years now, *The Progressive* has made it a practice to provide a free subscription to any prisoner who requested it. We know from the correspondence we receive that these copies are widely circulated and deeply appreciated.

What, one wonders, is so lunatic about offering free subscriptions to prisoners? What is so knee-slappingly *funny?*

[*September, 1980*]

The Detroit Free Press

Still suffering dementia praecox, Dr. Garry Wills slogs on, shouldering the burdens of citizenship in this hellish land:

It makes me wonder—what victims are we ignoring now? Boat people? The unborn? For years we hid from ourselves the tyranny exercised over our own black fellow citizens. (FDR worked in the '30s to block anti-lynching planks in the Democratic platforms.) Even if we descend, or ascend, from the horror of multiple lives taken, what rights denied do we deny the reality of? Those of Palestinians? Of gay people?

[*August 1, 1980*]

The Nation

A Mr. M. J. Akbar, editor of *Sunday*, "a leading weekly news journal published in India," lectures the *Nation's* famously credulous clients as to the superiority of the Third World in English of the Hey-Joe-Want-To-Meet-My-Seester variety:

Nobody in the Third World, including India, which Americans suspect is a Russian surrogate only because it refuses to be a United States surrogate, likes the idea of a Russian bear hug. What happened in Afghanistan, in any case, was not a bear hug, but simple rape. But if nobody likes Russian soldiers, nobody likes the idea of the *U.S.S. Enterprise* patrolling nearby waters either. Almost all the Third World nations have come to realize that the way to fight one superpower is not by jumping into the arms of another. The world is not ringing up Big Brother anymore (mainly because Big Brothers tend to confuse affection and rape); the nations of the Third World are ringing one another up. Why? Because Small Brother is not so small anymore; Small Brother has grown up.

Small Brothers know that the ability of both the United States and Russia to insult them is undiminished. While the Soviet Union of course has given us the classic example in Afghanistan, the United States in its own way showed how much respect it had for the black nations of Africa—in a much less harmful way, to be sure, and one that was regarded by the United States as a friendly gesture. I refer to the decision to send former heavyweight champion Muhammad Ali to Africa to persuade black nations to boycott the Olympics. Ali may be a great boxer, but is he the man to send on a sensitive diplomatic mission? France sent a team to the Moscow Olympics. Would President Carter send Jimmy Connors, or better still, Chris Evert Lloyd in her shorts, to persuade President Valery Giscard d'Estaing to change his mind? No. D'Estaing is a white head of state, you see. He is a sensible man. Carter's Georgian Mafia remains precisely that—Georgian.

The United States is going through a period when the Lying Adjective and the Angry Hyperbole have taken over its thought processes. These are perilous times.

[*September 13, 1980*]

The Los Angeles Times

In an otherwise amicable review of the movie *Mountain Men*, the eminent Linda Gross spies some very alarming infringements against the latest requirements in state *kul'tura:*

The crude language and the violence of survival is appropriate considering the lives that these mountain men lead. What is jarring, at this late date, is the condescending portrayal of the relations between settlers and Indians.

While some of the attitudes towards women and Indians that were prevalent in the 1830s still exist today, there is a tendency among moderns to at least try and minimize racism and sexism.

In "The Mountain Men" the Indians are portrayed as being warlike, even if their behavior is shown to be justifiable self-defense. The film also shows Indians trading their women as though they were cattle and then using them like beasts of burden. The mountain men are depicted treating women in much the same way, except they draw the line, at least in this picture, at brutality and rape.

Stephen Macht (who isn't a Native American) plays a Blackfoot chief whose wife (most convincingly portrayed by Victoria Racimo) chooses to run away and team up with Heston. . . . "The Mountain Men," is rated R for strong language, violence and one scene of sexual brutality between Macht and Racimo, which isn't graphic but is demeaning to women.

[*September 13, 1980*]

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
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

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